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ЕТНОКУЛЬТУРНИЙ РОЗВИТОК УКРАЇНСЬКОГО СУСПІЛЬСТВА НА ПОЧАТКУ ХХІ СТОЛІТТЯ: РЕВАНШ ПРОРОСІЙСЬКИХ СИЛ В УКРАЇНІ

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Анотація. У статті проаналізовано етнокультурний розвиток українського соціуму в умовах актуалізації реваншизму проросійських сил в Україні на початку ХХІ ст. З'ясовано, що третій етап етнокультурного розвитку українського суспільства (2010–2013 рр.) відзначився потужним тиском рашистських і проросійських сил в Україні на все українське. Зазначено, що етнокультурний розвиток українського суспільства на початку ХХІ ст. характеризує онтологію цивілізаційного конфлікту між російською євразійською автократією й українською європейською демократією. Це дає можливість осягнути його вплив на Україну й українців та зрозуміти, яким чином реваншистська загроза з боку рашистів стимулювала протидію українського громадянського суспільства й призвела до усунення від влади проросійського режиму кремлівських проксі. Обґрунтовано, що очолив цю неоімперську реваншистську реконкісту тогочасний міністр освіти і науки у двох урядах М. Азарова – Д. Табачник. Він систематично і цілеспрямовано намагався зупинити українізацію та розпочав повторну русифікацію українського гуманітарного простору. Прослідковано, що, прикриваючись турботою про національні меншини, він та його команда намагалися звузити простір функціонування української мови та розширити суспільний ареал побутування російської. Це завдання мав виконати й ганебний закон «Про засади державної мовної політики» С. Ківалова і В. Колесніченка. Виявлено, що де «русский мир» набув найбільшого розповсюдження, а це передусім терени Криму та Донбасу, там він став каталізатором кровопролитного російсько-українського збройного протистояння. У тих регіонах України, де «русский мир» не мав панівних позицій в освіті, науці і культурі, було збережено українську державність, національну ідентичність та український етнокультурний простір. Доведено, що попри системний наступ рашистів і проросійських сил в Українській державі на український етнокультурний простір українці зберегли в цілому (попри деякі негативні тенденції) ті визначні здобутки, які вони зуміли досягти упродовж попередніх двадцяти років в Україні.

Ключові слова: Україна; українці; українознавство; український етнокультурний простір; росія; реваншизм; «русский мир»; «рашизм».

ETHNOCULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY: REVANCHE OF PRO-RUSSIAN FORCES IN UKRAINE

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Annotation. *The article analyses the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society in the context of the actualization of the revanche of pro-russian forces in Ukraine at the beginning of the 21st century.*

It was found that the third stage of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society (2010–2013) was marked by the powerful pressure of rashist and pro-russian forces in Ukraine on everything Ukrainian. It is noted that the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society at the beginning of the 21st century characterised the ontology of the civilizational conflict between russian Eurasian autocracy and Ukrainian European democracy. This makes it possible to understand its influence on Ukraine and Ukrainians and how the revanchist threat from the racists stimulated the opposition of Ukrainian civil society and led to the removal from power of the pro-russian regime of kremlin proxies. It is justified that this neo-imperial revanchist reconquest was led by the then Minister of Education and Science in the two governments of M. Azarov – D. Tabachnyk. He systematically and purposefully tried to stop Ukrainization and started the repeated russification of the Ukrainian humanitarian space.

It has been traced that, under the cover of concern for national minorities, he and his team tried to narrow the space of the Ukrainian language functioning and expand the social area of the russian language. The shameful law "On the Principles of State Language Policy" by S. Kivalov and V. Kolesnichenko had to fulfil this task. It was revealed that where the "russian world" became the most widespread, which is, first of all, the territories of Crimea and Donbas, there it became the catalyst of the bloody russian-Ukrainian armed conflict. In those regions of Ukraine where the "russian world" did not have dominant positions in education, science, and culture, Ukrainian statehood, national identity, and Ukrainian ethnocultural space were preserved. It has been proven that despite the systematic attack of the russian nationalists and pro-russian forces in the Ukrainian state on the Ukrainian ethnocultural space, Ukrainians have generally preserved (despite some negative trends) the significant gains they managed to achieve during the previous twenty years in Ukraine.

Key words: *Ukraine; Ukrainians; Ukrainian studies; Ukrainian ethnocultural space; russia; revanchism; "russian world"; "rashism".*

Statement of the problem. The victory of the Orange Revolution became a significant event for Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and the entire post-Soviet space. The resounding success of the pro-European democratic forces and the crushing defeat of the Eurasian autocratic group in Ukraine became a real challenge for the russian authorities. The kremlin, its secret agents, and its open supporters have made considerable efforts to destroy the unity of the European powers, quarrel, and return their puppets to power. They successfully implemented this insidious plan during 2010–2013, when a powerful revanche of pro-russian neo-imperial forces took place in Ukraine.

Despite the temporary tactical success of the pro-putin revanchists in Ukraine, civil society managed to unite and purposefully defend Ukrainian values (native language, mentality, traditions, and customs) in education, science, culture, informational and humanitarian space, and the Eurointegration aspirations of Ukrainians, which eventually led to the Ukrainian national revolution at the beginning of the 21st century.

The relevance of the declared topic is revealed in the comprehension of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society in the conditions of the revanchist attack of pro-russian forces in Ukraine and the active opposition to revanchism,

“russian world”, “rashism” of civil society, which ultimately led to the Revolution of Dignity, the collapse of the pro-putin regime, and a significant strengthening of the Eurointegration aspirations of Ukrainians.

This work is implemented within the framework of the scientific research project financed from the state budget “Ethnocultural Development of Modern Ukrainian Society in the Conditions of the Policy of Revenge of the Russian Federation”. It is implemented at the Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as RIUS) according to the line of the planned work of the Ukrainian Ethnology Department.

Analysis of recent sources, research, and publications. Characterising the professional research in which the solution to this problem has been started, we can state that the systematic study of the impact of the neo-imperial policy of putin’s revanchism on ethnocultural processes in modern Ukraine has not yet become a complex object of scientific research. However, some important aspects of this problem are actively studied by scientists. In particular, this is a question of the active promotion of the neo-imperial geopolitical doctrine “russian world” into the Ukrainian ethnocultural space and a professional analysis of the anti-Ukrainian activities of kremlin agents and providers of this criminal concept in Ukraine.

A number of Ukrainian researchers are dealing with the problems of studying the conceptual ideological foundations, geopolitics, and internal politics of the modern authoritarian russian federation (hereinafter referred to as the rf), the formation and development of the doctrine

of the “russian world” and its criminal role in the destruction of Ukrainian identity and Ukrainianness.

In particular, in 2018, L. Yakubova published a very important study on this issue – the scientific work “Russian World in Ukraine: on the Edge of the Abyss”. The researcher quite systematically characterised the specifics of this anti-Ukrainian geopolitical doctrine. Namely: the path the “russian world” overcame from an idea to a doctrine; the influence of Neo-Eurasian interpretations of Duginism on the formation of this construct; how the official history and politics of memory in the rf contributed into the instrumentalization of the political technology of the “russian world”; the role the Russian Orthodox Church and religion played in the mental landscape of the “russian world”; how this anti-Ukrainian doctrine destroyed ethno-national stability in the Ukrainian state, provoked a “war of memories” and “language wars”, thereby preparing the socio-political, socio-cultural and socio-economic foundations of the “russian spring”; the way the russians managed to actively use the “russian world” as an effective tool of the russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014–2015; functioning of the “russian world” in the so-called “LDNR” and temporarily occupied Crimea during 2014–2018; testing of “two Ukraines” by the “russian world”; active Ukrainian spiritual and artistic opposition to the doctrine of the “russian world” and other negative effects of this geopolitical doctrine on the socio-political, socio-cultural, ethnocultural and information spheres of the Ukrainian state [13].

In 2019, the monograph “Ontology of War and Peace: Security, Strategy, Meaning” by B. Parakhonskyi and H. Yavorska was

published. The authors of the scientific work professionally analysed the deep essence of war and peace in the context of Ukraine's experience in countering the russian hybrid war, which became a long-term factor with destructive effects on the Ukrainian political, economic, and socio-cultural reality. Understanding the civilizational confrontation between russia and Ukraine, scientists also paid attention to the "russian world". In their opinion, this ideological concept has gained significant popularity in russian political and intellectual circles in recent years and is primarily related to the ideas of fundamentalist integrationism of russian national patriots, figures of the Moscow Orthodox Church, supporters of "great russia", who traditionally consider Ukrainians and Belarusians only as branches of the great russian ethnos [5, p. 285].

In 2022, V. Kryshchenko, Yu. Fihurnyi, and O. Chirkov published the monograph "Ukrainian Christianity: Affirmation of Identity. Conceptual Essays," on the pages of which are systematically analysed the origin, formation, development, and current state of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, in particular its acquisition of autocephaly. Taking into account the urgency of countering the invasion of the "russian world" in the Ukrainian state, scientists have systematically characterised its criminal role in the assimilation of Ukrainians and the destruction of Ukrainian Orthodoxy: "The great-power imperial russian ideology was an active factor in the destruction of Ukraine and Ukrainians. At first it was the sacred concept "Moscow – the Third Rome", then the monarchical concept "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nation", later the Bolshevik slogan "Proletarians of all countries unite!" and finally the neo-imperial construct "russian world". Despite the slightly different

ideological content, interpretation, and implementation of all these ideologues, they were united by a complete non-acceptance of Ukraine and Ukrainians and an effort to finally get rid of them" [4, p. 162].

Despite these publications, the problem of studying putin's doctrine of the "russian world" as an important component of the neo-imperial political ideology – "rashism" and a significant element of the revanchist policy of the rf against Ukraine remains relevant and requires further scientific study. This especially applies to the methods of opposing this neo-imperial geopolitical doctrine during the undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war.

The source base of the study is the works and public speeches of apologists, theoreticians, providers, and supporters of the "russian world", in particular, the writings and interviews of D. Tabachnyk and other pro-russian proxies, as well as the own observations of one of the authors of this study (Yu. Fihurnyi), who was a direct participant in Ukrainian ethnocultural processes at the beginning of the 21st century. By studying and comprehending these narratives, Ukrainian scientists have the opportunity to systematically reveal their criminal anti-Ukrainian essence and develop analytical materials that will help counter the enemy and defeat the rashists.

Formulation of the goals of the article (statement of the task). The purpose of the study is a systematic analysis of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society at the beginning of the 21st century, which took place in the conditions of the revanchist attack of pro-russian forces in Ukraine. The task of the research is to: characterise the historiography of the problem study and the source base; analyse the peculiarities of ethnocultural processes

in Ukraine at the beginning of the 21st century; characterise the anti-Ukrainian activities of D. Tabachnyk aimed at the implementation of the “russian world” in the Ukrainian ethnocultural space and the destruction by rashists of the identity of the Ukrainian people; summarise.

The scientific novelty of the work lies in the development of relevant issues, which, despite many related publications, remain insufficiently studied and therefore require further professional studies. Since understanding the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society at the beginning of the 21st century, we have the opportunity to professionally characterise the essence of the civilizational conflict between the russian Eurasian autocracy and Ukrainian European democracy, its impact on Ukraine and Ukrainians, and how the revanchist threat from the russian federation stimulated the counteracting of Ukrainian civil society and eventually led to the removal from power of the pro-russian kremlin proxies.

Presenting the main material.

Beginning the study of this important scientific issue, we immediately want to characterise the fundamental concepts on which our research is based. First, “russian world” is not an ordinary cultural pseudo-liberal project; “de jure,” it is adjusted to preserving and developing the russian language, culture, and traditions, both in the russian federation and in the countries of the so-called “near abroad” (former Soviet republics) and “far abroad” (all over the world countries) among the so-called russian-speaking population; and “de facto,” putin’s geopolitical doctrine is aimed at the theoretical justification and practical restoration of “great historical russia” within the borders of the russian empire

at the peak of its power in 1914. It was the “russian world” that became one of the important components of the neo-imperial political ideology – “rashism,” and the basis of russia’s initially hybrid and eventually full-scale aggression against Ukraine.

Second, “rashism” is putin’s neo-imperial political ideology and sociocultural practice of the russian state formation, which emerged on the ruins of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as the USSR) in 1991. The leadership and the vast majority of its population, the so-called “deep people”, strive to restore the USSR 2.0 in the format of “great historical russia” and eventually return the russian federation to global leadership in the world, leaving behind and overcoming the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China. Rashism is characterised by such specific features as: fanatical intolerance of liberal Western civilization, especially the so-called “Anglo-Saxons”, who exist only to destroy the “great russian orthodox civilization”; obvious supremacy and disdain for the language, culture, traditions and customs of other nations and peoples, since the main goal of rashists, carriers of rashism, is to conquer, rob, weaken and assimilate (absorb) other ethnic communities conquered by them; militant aggressiveness, whereas the fact that the most important tool for solving geopolitical and political problems for the rashists is the military force, namely the use of well-armed and well-trained professionals outside the russian federation – both soldiers of the russian armed forces and mercenaries of private military companies, and in moscow itself - the police and the russian National Guard; messianic arrogance and conviction in the extraordinary God’s chosenness of the russian Orthodox civilization, since

the rashists are convinced that only “great historical russia” will save the entire human civilization from destruction and death; treachery and cynicism in the use of any means to achieve the set geopolitical and political tasks – world domination, such as, for example, cybernetic attacks on the banking, economic, military, electoral and other spheres of countries unfriendly to the russian federation, dirty blackmailing of Europeans with energy dependence on the russian federation and attempts to dictate to the governments of these states terms and wishes; informational dominance in the humanitarian discourse and targeted imposing of racist meanings and values on the citizens of the russian federation and other countries, thereby forming supporters, like-minded people, sympathisers and so-called “useful idiots” among the population of these countries. This entire criminal toolkit helps rashism and rashists create for the russian federation an attractive “export” image of a country to which the higher heavenly powers entrusted the mission of saving human civilization from impoverishment and self-destruction.

The third stage of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society (2010–2013) revealed that in the future it is ready to fight and defend the gains achieved by civil society in previous years, despite its negative manifestations, namely the total attack of the pro-russian authorities on the Ukrainian ethnocultural space. Unsatisfactory domestic and foreign policies of V. Yushchenko prepared the ground for the return to power of the pro-russian Party of Regions of Ukraine and its leader, V. Yanukovich. The presidency of Viktor Fedorovich became a real trial for civil society, and finally, despite all the troubles and horrors, it defeated the autocrat in February 2014.

Although in 2010–2013 it seemed that this team of “strong managers” planned to stay for a long time, as they ignored national interests (signing of the so-called Kharkiv agreements in 2010, according to which, starting May 28, 2017, the validity of the intergovernmental agreement between Ukraine and the rf regarding the deployment of military facilities of the Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine in Crimea was extended for 25 years) and enriched themselves at any cost.

V. Golovko and S. Yanishevskiy believe that as a representative of the “white-blue” political camp, V. Yanukovich consciously started the implementation of the two most important political goals of this patriotic-business group (which at the same time played the role of its attribute characteristics): deepening relations with the rf and increasing the status of the russian language in Ukraine [1, p. 548].

D. Tabachnyk, a well-known Ukrainophile and eater-of-all-Ukrainian, became an effective tool for the destruction of the Ukrainian ethnocultural space. As the Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine during 2010–2013, Dmytro Volodymyrovych tried to stop the Ukrainization of education and science in particular and the entire humanitarian sphere in general, and he actively russified everything he could. Despite the fact that from the first day in this position, namely from March 11, 2010, he was tried to be dismissed, but having high patrons in moscow, he systematically destroyed the Ukrainian ethnocultural space until he was deprived of his position on February 23, 2014, after V. Yanukovich escaped from Ukraine.

The main danger for the Ukrainian ethnocultural space was that D. Tabachnyk was a very intelligent and cynical enemy of

Ukraine, Ukrainians, and Ukrainianness. He did everything systematically, comprehensively, and purposefully, covering up his own criminal actions with care for ordinary citizens of Ukraine and state affairs. His supervisors from the kremlin set him a number of clear tasks. First, to stop the Ukrainization of Ukraine's humanitarian space and start its step-by-step rusification. Second, to halt the spread of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and begin returning russian to all spheres of social, political, economic, and cultural life. Third, suppress the European integration aspirations of Kyiv within his competence (education and science) and activate the Eurasian vector of development in Ukraine's humanitarian sphere. Fourth, to reset the historical memory of Ukrainians: minimise the negativity of the Soviet past and intensify criticism of the national liberation movement of the late 1930s and early 1950s. (to defame the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and its leaders, first of all, R. Shukhevych); to use the controversial events of the Second World War, namely, the Volyn tragedy, in their criminal interests with the aim to finally cause embroil and split apart Ukrainians and Poles; to introduce in Ukraine the russian cult of the so-called "pobedobesie" (victory frenzy), etc. Unfortunately, during almost four years of being in power, D. Tabachnyk managed to do a lot. In our opinion, much of what happened later in 2014, namely the seizure of the Crimean Peninsula by the russians, the so-called "russian spring" and the terrorist-separatist explosion of violence in the East of Ukraine is the work and mind activity of the criminal minister D. Tabachnyk.

It is indicative that already during his first visit to the russian federation on April 6, 2010 as a minister, he spoke with

a journalist from the so-called liberal radio station "Echo of Moscow" and very cautiously made public his plans for the near future. Their main essence was to gradually start the process of de-Ukrainizing education under the cover of European, politically correct, balanced, and liberal postulates. Because education is not only the education and training of future citizens and what they will be: pro-Ukrainian, pro-russian, pro-Hungarian, etc., but also the foundations of the entire Ukrainian society: active, passive, patriotic, etc. Revanchist strategists understood well that whoever runs education will soon impose its own conditions on society. D. Tabachnyk received a "heavy" inheritance from his predecessors – approximately 80% of Ukrainian schools and the remaining 20% mainly russian, with a small number of schools teaching in the languages of national minorities (Hungarian, Romanian, Moldovan, Crimean Tatar, etc.).

For the minister eater-of-all-Ukrainian, this approximately 20% of schools were to become a springboard for an attack on the enemy – Ukrainian schools, and, over time, he was convinced that he would successfully russify most of them or simply destroy them as unnecessary. All this had to be done gradually but consistently. Thus, the introduction of external independent testing (hereinafter - EIT) to higher educational institutions in Ukraine became a huge achievement of Ukrainian education reforms. EIT destroyed large corruption schemes, allowed clever children to enter prestigious universities without so-called "blat" (profitable connections) and bribes, and greatly raised the status of the Ukrainian language, since it was solely in Ukrainian.

What does D. Tabachnyk do? He allows students from schools with non-Ukrainian

languages to take EIT in their language, justifying it by the fact that graduates of schools with other languages of teaching will be in worse conditions than their peers from Ukrainian schools. Seems to be no big deal? No, this is only the first step to returning lost positions to the Russian language in secondary school; next is higher school, in which, according to the legislation of Ukraine, education has to be only in the state language. By his decrees, D. Tabachnyk allowed universities to form study groups with non-Ukrainian languages of teaching. So, step by step, decree after decree, the Ukrainian language retreats and the Russian language regains its lost positions.

It should be noted, that O. Venediktov, the editor-in-chief of the Moscow radio station, sometimes asked D. Tabachnyk thorny questions: "So, I checked in Sevastopol, out of 68 schools, 67 are Russian. How can a guy from the Sevastopol Russian school pass an external test at the Kharkiv Aviation Institute, where teaching is in Ukrainian?" To this, D. Tabachnyk answered: "He will pass the testing at his testing centre in the city of Sevastopol in Russian because it is the language of teaching physics, mathematics, and astronomy. But, in addition, he studied the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian literature for all these 10 years. Consequently, teaching at Zhukovskiy Kharkiv Aviation University will not be a stumbling block for him" [12].

And this is a lie and manipulation, as one of the co-authors of this study (Yu. Fihurnyi), after graduating from the 8th grade of the Ukrainian-speaking secondary school № 1 in the city of Zhmerynka (Vinnytsia region), tried to enter the Suvorov school (he dreamed of becoming a tank officer, but how good, that this dream did not come true). It was 1980, the year of the

Moscow Olympics. For some reason, the Kyiv Suvorov School did not recruit many applicants that year, and the Soviet military commissariat sent many applicants to the Minsk Suvorov School. While studying at a Ukrainian school, he knew Russian quite well, but it turned out that such close Eastern Slavic languages as Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian are very different in practice. This was especially true of terminology in physics, algebra, and geometry textbooks. Knowledge of the Russian language and literature did not help here at all, and unsatisfactory grades in these examination subjects, among others, put a bold cross on the young man's dreams of a military career.

For D. Tabachnyk, the Russian language is only one of the highest achievements "along with Russian culture" of Eurasian civilization. Therefore, for him, the natural dominance of Ukrainian in Ukraine and the secondary position of Russian are automatically an existential challenge that must be overcome even at the cost of one's own successful career: "Moreover, from the point of view of the cultural heritage of Ukraine, from the point of view of the history of Ukraine in general, for example, it still hurts me when people say that the Russian language is the language of a national minority. In the cultural heritage of Ukraine, the Russian language is as fundamental as the Ukrainian language. Yes, Ukrainian is the state language, but the same norm of the Constitution of Ukraine separately positions Article 10 "Russian language", distinguishing it from the group of other languages" [12].

Tabachnyk perceived the beginning of the Ukrainization of education in Ukraine in 1992–1993 as a personal disaster. He is convinced that those who graduated from most schools before 1993 received normal,

natural bilingualism, an understanding of the language, and mastery of the subject of Ukrainian and Russian culture. Dmytro Volodymyrovych is “sincerely” convinced that absolute bilingualism is the greatest achievement of many years in Ukraine [12].

Scientists-linguists, both domestic and foreign, have convincingly proven in their works that two more or less related languages cannot function peacefully in the same territory. Sooner or later, one of them will win and completely absorb the other. A vivid example of this axiom is the stagnation and death of the Belarusian language in Belarus. Such a misfortune awaited the Ukrainian language as well, but the powerful opposition of civil society stood in the way of the imperial revanchists. Therefore, all of D. Tabachnyk’s reflections on bilingualism are only the dreams of the Ukrainophobe emperor about the final extermination of Ukrainian. The genocide of Ukrainians had to be intensified (the so-called controlling shot in the head) by the linguicide of nightingale’s language.

As we have already noted above, the Kremlin, in its plans to suppress Ukraine, dreamed of reloading the ethnic, national, and historical memory of the Ukrainian people. The Kremlin ideologues planned to suppress the so-called rebuilding criticism of totalitarian repressions, to detract from the truth about the Holodomor-genocide of 1932–1933, to disgrace and dishonour the heroic rank of the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, to reopen the bloody wounds of the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation in Volyn, to impose on Ukrainians a cult of the so-called “pobedobesie,” and so on. Here, D. Tabachnyk was assigned the important task of substantiating the Kremlin-revanchist narratives theoretically and successfully realising them later.

Answering V. Venediktov’s question about how the minister planned to solve the non-acceptance of certain heroes, for example, Stepan Bandera, in various regions of Ukraine and finally remove this contradiction, D. Tabachnyk answered: “It appears to me that removing should be accomplished through humanising and depoliticizing mandatory school history courses. These are common words. I want to say without using common words that Ukrainophilia or Ukraine loving does not imply mandatory Polonophobia or Russophobia... I think that in the course of mandatory education in secondary schools in Ukraine - we are talking about schools, yes - it is possible to soften and more objectively explain a lot of positions. But, you see, the problem lies in the fact that the south, the east, and the centre of Ukraine fell ill with the fascination with totalitarianism in its internationalist, or, let’s say, class form” [12].

To O. Venediktov’s honour, he immediately wondered what to do with the monument to J. Stalin in Zaporizhzhia. To which the minister succinctly replied: “First of all, to be tolerant of each region and each other. And second, to give maximum freedom at the discretion of the regions” [12].

After all, the white-blue autocratic regime tolerated any pro-Russian actions and gave the most power to local regional officials and politicians, especially in the East and South of Ukraine, where the criminal “Russian world” prevailed. The result was not long in coming; the Russian-speaking population of Crimea greeted the “liberators” with joy, and the so-called “Russian spring” has captured the South and East of Ukraine. There, where the pro-Ukrainian forces were united, the Katsap bastard got kicked in the teeth: Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv. Where separatist terrorists

prevailed, the “russian world” won. All this regional separatism existed in the 90s at the beginning of the 21st century, but it gained special elevation with the regionals coming to power.

D. Tabachnyk supported and encouraged regional separatism in every possible way. As always, his cunning and cynical mind found opportunities to circumvent the law, weaken the common Ukrainian identity, and strengthen the regional anti-Ukrainian and pro-russian orientation of the development of the South and East of Ukraine. If the history textbook is a national one and it takes a lot of time and effort to rewrite it and endow it with pro-russian meanings (so many spears were broken over the project of a joint russian-Ukrainian history textbook), the result turned out to be nothing, it did not live up to the expectations of the imperialists. In turn, textbooks on local history, regional history, etc., do not have all-Ukrainian publicity, but they do their job well both to the benefit and to the detriment of Ukrainian statehood, depending on which narratives and orientations the authors of these materials lay in them: Ukrainian or russian senses.

We will once again give the floor to the minister eater-of-all-Ukrainian: “We have a single textbook. And the competition is held by the Ministry among the Manuscripts of each subject, each class. But, at the same time, I consider it positive that, like in European schools, a significant amount of time allocated to history is occupied by local history. It can be taught, for example, there was one in Kyiv, one of the first textbooks “The History of My City”. This is the history of Kyiv. It can be a local lore textbook or a textbook on local history. And in general, to date, I have already repeatedly told teachers from the south and the east, as well as teachers from the west, that when

you curse the biased textbook created under Yushchenko, you do not want to look at the law. And it is written in the law that any secondary school has the right to prepare subjects and optional courses themselves, even today, for up to 40 percent of the teaching time. Therefore, Kharkiv scientists should not moan at conferences but make a normal, good, high-quality, accessible to children school textbook “History of the Sloboda region”, and there tell about the fact that Kharkiv region has always developed as a region of cross-border cooperation, friendly to both Ukraine and russia. And that there were two migration flows, that people who came from Voronezh, from the Volga, and people who came from the Novgorod-Siversky lands, from the territory of the current Chernihiv region, built bins against the nomads” [12].

Here is such an aerobatic by D. Tabachnyk to undermine Ukrainian statehood under the cover of European practices. Later, regionals will apply this principle during their planned attack on Ukrainian-language educational institutions. In 2011, a scandal erupted with the closure of a Ukrainian school in Krasnyi Luch, Luhansk region. Local officials explained that the school was closed due to a poor number of pupils, i. e., the Ukrainian language of teaching is not needed in the schools of the Luhansk region, but in fact the school was closed due to a convenient location after its premises were planned to be given to the office of the youth organisation of the Party of Regions of Ukraine. This scandal of the government received all-Ukrainian publicity, and President V. Yanukovich was forced to instruct Prime Minister V. Azarov and his subordinate D. Tabachnyk to check the validity of closing a school with the Ukrainian language of teaching [14]

Already on March 2, 2011, D. Tabachnyk declared the need to close 10% of schools where only a few students studied. The minister proposed to transport children to other educational institutions by school buses. Later, Tabachnyk said that schools were closed due to the lack of children in the country. And on March 30, the mass media spread information about the increase in the number of russian-language schools and kindergartens in the new school year (2011–2012). It was planned to increase the number of russian-language schools and kindergartens in the new school year in Kyiv. This was announced by the head of the Main Department of Education and Science of the Kyiv City State Administration (hereinafter – KCSA), Vira Horiunova. According to her, this is due to the fact that in Kyiv the number of parents who want their children to study in russian is growing. “Russian-speaking kindergartens and russian-speaking schools will be opened, because the number of businesses and representatives of other countries who doesn’t not know the Ukrainian language is increasing in the city. First of all, we are opening schools for them. And for everyone who wants to study in russian,” V. Horiunova explained. She also stressed that this will not be due to a reduction in the number of Ukrainian-speaking educational institutions. Russian-speaking schools and kindergartens will be established in accordance with the submitted applications.

It is also planned to open russian-speaking groups at Ukrainian-speaking kindergartens. “If a group of parents who want to teach in russian is recruited, a group is opened in a kindergarten. This does not mean that we are alone. Currently, there is no russian-speaking kindergarten in Kyiv. There are only 8 schools (7,000 children)

that study in russian,” said the head. Vadym Kolesnichenko, a deputy from the Party of Regions faction, also actively advocated for the opening of russian-speaking kindergartens. He announced that, with the support of benefactors, he intends to open russian-speaking preschool establishments in the capital. But KCSA notes that there is still no significant demand for such educational institutions [8].

Hiding behind his concern for human rights, D. Tabachnyk persistently implemented the kremlin’s task of increasing the number of schools with the russian language of teaching in order to significantly expand the territory of the “russian world” due to the Ukrainian ethno-cultural complex. In one of the media interviews, the Minister of Education stated: “In Ukraine, there will be more schools with the russian language of teaching if such wishes are put forward by the parents of the students.” There will be more. If the parents want to... The minister can’t do that.” According to the minister, according to statistics in Ukraine, 77% are Ukrainians, 17% are russians, and the rest are citizens of other nationalities. “But at this ratio, 60% of the population in the capital speaks, lives, communicates, and dates girls in russian. Of the 537 secondary schools, only five teach entirely in russian,” Tabachnyk added. He also said that schools can order textbooks in russian this year if they wish, but pupils will still be required to study Ukrainian literature and language and take final exams. “Therefore, a school with the russian language of teaching does not prevent a young citizen of Ukraine from getting an education, actually, in two languages: russian and Ukrainian,” the Minister noted [6].

For a pro-russian official, a revanchist imperialist, everything Ukrainian has less

value (language, culture, history, literature, art, etc.), and everything russian is the best achievement of human civilization.

Thus, in the next interview with the journalists of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”, D. Tabachnyk emphasised that knowledge of russian literature is one of the mandatory and indispensable features of every civilised and educated person. “I am convinced that the education of every truly civilised and truly educated person consists of several fundamental things... This is great Greek philosophy, russian literature, and German logic,” Tabachnyk said in an interview with Echo of Moscow radio. “Despite the resistance of the nationalists, we created a programme this year, and we will do it for all classes, which is called “World Literature”, where russian literature covers a very large amount,” the minister assured, adding that this year the ministry allows all parents to choose the language of education for their children. According to him, “this year, schools in Kharkiv, Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, and other regions, if they want to order textbooks for 11th grade in russian, they will receive them in russian at the expense of the state budget.” Tabachnyk also reported that in that year, the All-Ukrainian Olympiad in russian language and literature was restored [7].

Under the cover of theses about increasing the competitiveness of school graduates on the labour market both in Ukraine, Europe, and the world, the minister eater-of-all-Ukrainian achieved that in educational institutions Ukrainian youth had to study not one language as before, but mandatory two foreign languages. It is interesting that, for some reason, the russian language, which D. Tabachnyk himself considered to be no stranger to Ukrainians, was included in this variable list. The vast

majority of parents, saving their own children from overload, chose russian as a second foreign language. Thus, the language of the aggressive northeastern neighbour triumphantly returned to the educational process in Ukraine.

The systematic anti-Ukrainian activity of D. Tabachnyk during these years ultimately led to a significant strengthening of the position of the “russian world” in Ukraine. Thus, to the request of Tyzhden.UA, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine replied that out of 19070 secondary schools functioning in Ukraine, teaching in russian is carried out in 1256, in particular, in the 2012/2013 school year, out of 225 690 classes of general educational institutions, 191502 classes are taught in Ukrainian (84.9%), and 31372 are taught in russian (13.9%). The largest number of schools with russian language teaching are in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (343), Donetsk (200), and Luhansk (151) regions [9].

Where the “russian world” has become mostly widespread, namely the territories of Crimea and Donbas, they have become the arena of the russian-Ukrainian armed conflict. And in those regions of Ukraine, where the “russian world” did not have dominant positions in education, science, and culture, Ukrainian statehood, national identity, and Ukrainian ethnocultural space were preserved [10, p. 82].

D. Tabachnyk, a rashist scoundrel and agent of influence, being in the influential position of the head of the Ministry of Education and Culture of Ukraine and understanding the importance of Ukrainian studies for the comprehensive development of the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian ethnocultural space, started a real war against the National Research

Institute of Ukrainian Studies and its director, the founder of modern Ukrainian studies, P. Kononenko. The main goal of this purposeful anti-Ukrainian struggle was the removal of Petro Petrovych from the position of head of the institute, the radical re-profiling of the Ukrainian studies institution, and the complete destruction of Ukrainian studies in the near future. Pro-Putin's proxy, D. Tabachnyk, actively and persistently carried out the instructions of the kremlin ideologues of the "russian world," for whom Ukrainian studies were a real threat and their weakening, and over time, their complete elimination was very necessary. Since, in Ukraine, the "russian world" could not coexist tolerantly with Ukrainian studies, that is why the rashists tried to destroy it. Eventually, D. Tabachnyk succeeded in removing P. Kononenko from his position and appointing his own person, A. Tchaikovskyi, but Ukrainian studies scientists managed to defend and preserve the institute and Ukrainian studies as an integrative science and educational discipline [11, p. 42–44].

The next powerful promotional measure of russian language in the humanitarian space of Ukraine was the Law "On the Principles of State Language Policy" №5029-VI (Ukrainians called it: "Kivalov-Kolesnichenko Law" or simply the "two K" law). Because it was these people's deputies from the Party of Regions of Ukraine who prepared this anti-Ukrainian draft law and made considerable efforts for its adoption. On June 5, 2012, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted it in the first reading, and already on July 3, 2012, with violations of the Constitution of Ukraine, regulations and procedures were adopted in the second reading. On July 31, 2012, this document was signed by the Chairman of

the Verkhovna Rada, Volodymyr Lytvyn, and on August 8, 2012, by the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich. The law came into force on August 10, 2012. It established that the state language is Ukrainian, but significantly expanded the use of regional languages, if the number of speakers of these languages is at least 10% of the population of a certain region, and in some cases even less than 10%. It was applied to 18 languages. Namely: russian, Belarusian, Bulgarian, Armenian, Gagauz, Yiddish, Crimean Tatar, Moldavian, German, Modern Greek, Polish, Romany (Gipsy), Romanian, Slovak, Hungarian, Ruthenian, Karaite, and Crimean [3].

It was important that it terminated the law of the Ukrainian SSR "On language in the Ukrainian SSR". The adoption and implementation of this language law were a Pyrrhic victory for the pro-russian authorities. Yes, it outmanoeuvred pro-Ukrainian opposition parties in the parliament, regionalists imposed it on Ukrainian society, and the so-called "Language Maidan" did not lead to a revolution, but passionate Ukrainians did not forgive such violence and imprinted it in their memory. Eventually, this law became one of the factors that outraged Ukrainian society and started the National Ukrainian Revolution in Ukraine in the autumn of 2013.

According to V. Holovko, S. Kulchytskyi, and L. Yakubova, the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law became a distant echo of the language war in Ukraine and testified to the central place of Ukrainian-russian cultural rivalry in the social and political life of the Ukrainian state [1, p. 260].

Despite the powerful pressure of rashist revanchists, Ukrainians successfully hold the positions of Ukrainization of the humanitarian space of Ukraine. Let's recall

that D. Tabachnyk promised to cancel the restrictions on the showing of films in russian and the dubbing of films in Ukrainian at the beginning of 2010. No matter how hard he tried to realise his ideas, he failed.

According to the annual monitoring of the NGO "Space of Freedom" and the online publication "Texts", the share of dubbing in Ukrainian (dubbing or polyphonic dubbing) is as follows: in 2009 – 70.3%: Ukrainian dubbing (dubbing or polyphonic dubbing); 29.7%: dubbing in russian or another foreign language (and Ukrainian subtitles); in 2010 – 65.6%: dubbing in Ukrainian (dubbing or multi-voice dubbing); 34.3%: dubbing in russian or another foreign language (and Ukrainian subtitles); in 2011 – 65.2%: dubbing in Ukrainian (dubbing or multi-voice dubbing); 34.8%: dubbing in russian or another foreign language (and Ukrainian subtitles); in 2012 – 65.7%: dubbing in Ukrainian (dubbing or multi-voice dubbing); 34.3%: dubbing in russian or another foreign language (and Ukrainian subtitles); in 2013 – 69.3%: dubbing in Ukrainian (dubbing or multi-voice dubbing); 30.7%: dubbing in russian or another foreign language (and Ukrainian subtitles) [2].

Performing rashists' tasks, the pro-russian agents actively introduced criminal ideas and anti-Ukrainian principles of the "russian world" into the spiritual, humanitarian, informational, linguistic, cultural, educational, and scientific space of Ukraine, which finally led to the weakening of the Ukrainian state, the reduction of the Ukrainian ethnocultural space, and the significant strengthening of pro-putin supporters in the Crimea and the East of Ukraine.

Conclusions. Thus, having analysed the ethnocultural development of

Ukrainian society in the conditions of russian revanchism against Ukraine at the beginning of the 21st century, we came to the following conclusions: first, the third stage of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society (2010–2013) was marked by the powerful pressure of rashist and pro-russian forces in Ukraine on everything that is Ukrainian. Second, understanding the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society at the beginning of the 21st century helps to professionally characterise the ontology of the civilizational conflict between russian Eurasian autocracy and Ukrainian European democracy. This makes it possible to understand its influence on Ukraine and Ukrainians and to understand how the revanchist threat from the rashists stimulated the opposition of Ukrainian civil society and, eventually, led to the removal from power of the pro-russian regime of kremlin proxies. Third, this neo-imperial revanchist reconquest was led by D. Tabachnyk, the constant and indispensable Minister of Education and Science in the two governments of M. Azarov. He systematically and purposefully tried to stop Ukrainization and to start the repeated russification of the Ukrainian humanitarian space. Fourth, under the cover of concern for national minorities, he and his team tried to narrow the space for the Ukrainian language's functioning and expand the social range of the russian language. This task was to be fulfilled by the shameful anti-Ukrainian law "On the Principles of State Language Policy" by S. Kivalov and V. Kolesnichenko. Fifth, where "russian world" has gained the greatest spread, which is, first of all, the territories of Crimea and Donbas, it has become a catalyst for a bloody russian-Ukrainian armed conflict.

And in those regions of Ukraine where the “russian world” did not have dominant positions in education, science, and culture, Ukrainian statehood, national identity, and Ukrainian ethnocultural space were preserved. Sixth, despite the systematic attack of racists and pro-russian forces in the Ukrainian state on the Ukrainian ethnocultural space, Ukrainians have generally preserved (despite some negative trends) the significant gains they were able to achieve during the previous twenty years in Ukraine.

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