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## ЕТНОКУЛЬТУРНИЙ РОЗВИТОК УКРАЇНСЬКОГО СОЦІУМУ В УМОВАХ РЕВАНШИЗМУ РОСІЇ ЩОДО УКРАЇНИ У КІНЦІ ХХ – НА ПОЧАТКУ ХХІ СТОЛІТТЯ: ПЕРІОДИЗАЦІЯ ТА АНАЛІЗ

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**Анотація.** У статті проаналізовано етнокультурний розвиток українського соціуму в умовах реваншизму росії щодо України у кінці ХХ – на початку ХХІ ст. З'ясовано, що осмислення періодизації етнокультурного розвитку українського соціуму в умовах реваншистського курсу росії на відновлення її імперської потуги допомагає напрацюванню висновків щодо здобутків та допущених помилок для покращення сталого розвитку України на шляху євроатлантичної інтеграції. Зазначено, що етнокультурний розвиток українського суспільства в умовах реваншистсько-імперської політики росії можна умовно поділити на п'ять періодів (етапів): перший (1991–2004 рр.), другий (2005–2009 рр.), третій (2010–2013 рр.), четвертий (2014–2021 рр.) і п'ятий (2022 р. – сьогодні). У цій статті розглянуто два перших періоди.

Перший період етнокультурного розвитку українського суспільства є найбільш тривалим і характеризується як позитивними, так і негативними тенденціями. Умовно його можна поділити на два підперіоди: перший (1991–1999 рр.) та другий (2000–2004 рр.). Обґрунтовано, що цей поділ передусім обумовлений реваншистською політикою росії щодо України, оскільки у 1991–1999 рр. кремль вирішував власні суспільно-політичні проблеми й не міг повною мірою приділяти увагу Україні. Прослідковано, що після приходу до влади в. путіна, після суттєвого поліпшення політичного, економічного і фінансового становища в росії російська кліка значно посилила свій антиукраїнський вплив на український етнокультурний простір.

Другий період етнокультурного розвитку українського суспільства визначається подальшим розширенням функціонування української мови у суспільно-політичному житті, навчально-освітньому процесі, у сферах науки, культури, мистецтва, кіноіндустрії тощо. Доведено, що кремль, усвідомивши небезпеку просування ідеалів і досягнень Помаранчевої революції на пострадянському просторі, доклав чималих зусиль для її дискредитації та уопслідження, використовуючи для цього новостворену неоімперську реваншистську доктрину-концепт «русского мира».

**Ключові слова:** Україна; українці; російська федерація (росія); реваншизм; етнокультурні процеси (етнокультурний розвиток); періодизація; «русский мир».

## ETHNO-CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY IN THE CONDITIONS OF RUSSIAN REVANSCHISM TOWARDS UKRAINE AT THE END OF THE 20<sup>TH</sup> – AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY: PERIODIZATION AND ANALYSIS

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**Annotation.** *The article analyzes the ethno-cultural development of Ukrainian society in the conditions of russian revanchism towards Ukraine in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. It has been found that understanding the periodization of ethnocultural development of the Ukrainian society in the conditions of russia's revanchist course aimed to reclaim imperial power, helps to draw conclusions about the achievements and mistakes made to improve the sustainable development of Ukraine on the path of Euro-Atlantic integration. It is noted that the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society in the conditions of revanchist-imperial policy of russia can be conditionally divided into five periods (stages): the first (1991–2004), the second (2005–2009), the third (2010–2013), the fourth (2014–2021), and the fifth (2022–present). This article examines the first two periods.*

*The first period of ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society is the longest and is characterized by both positive and negative trends. Conventionally, it can be divided into two sub-periods: the first (1991–1999) and the second (2000–2004). It substantiated that this division is primarily caused by russia's revanchist policy towards Ukraine, since in 1999–1999 the Kremlin was solving its own socio-political problems and could not fully pay attention to Ukraine. It has been observed that after V. Putin came to power and the significant improvement of the political, economic, and financial situation in russia, the russian clique significantly increased its anti-Ukrainian influence on the Ukrainian ethno-cultural space.*

*The second period of the ethno-cultural development of Ukrainian society is determined by the further expansion of the Ukrainian language functioning in social and political life, the educational process, in the spheres of science, culture, art, the film industry, etc. It is proven that the Kremlin, realising the danger of promoting the ideals and achievements of the Orange Revolution in the post-Soviet space, made considerable efforts to discredit and stigmatise it, using the newly created neo-imperial revanchist doctrine-concept of "russian world" for this purpose.*

**Key words:** *Ukraine; Ukrainians; russian federation (russia); revanchism; ethnocultural processes (ethnocultural development); periodization; "russian world".*

**The problem statement.** For more than three centuries, most of the territory and later almost the entire ethnic territory of Ukraine was at first a part of the russian imperial state entity and somewhat later, the Soviet communist totalitarian one. During all this time, the metropolis tried to deprive the Ukrainian people of their native language, culture, identity, spirituality, etc. in every

possible way. Only with the restoration of Ukrainian statehood in 1991, did Ukrainians receive a genuine opportunity to break free from strong assimilation pressure and gradually begin the process of returning to the European civilization and finally break with the Eurasian quasi-civilization.

Since 1991, with the support of the institutions of the Ukrainian state,

Ukrainians have gradually been getting rid of the totalitarian legacy, not always consistent but persistently restoring their ethnocultural space and moving in the European direction. However, for all these 30 years, the north-eastern neighbour has attempted to stop this ongoing Euro-Atlantic development and return Ukraine to the Russian Federation (hereinafter the RF).

The significance of the stated theme is revealed in the understanding of the periods of Ukrainian society's ethnocultural development in the conditions of the revanchist course of the RF aimed at regaining its imperial power, in order to reach the correct conclusion from the achievements and mistakes and improve the sustainable development of Ukraine and Ukrainians on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration.

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**Analysis of recent sources, research, and publications.** Examining the professional studies in which the solution to this problem is being launched, we can state that the study of the influence of the Kremlin's revanchism policy on ethnocultural processes in modern Ukraine has not yet become a comprehensive object of scientific research. At the same time, scientists are actively studying some important aspects of this problem. In particular, this is an issue of the functioning and development of the Ukrainian language, the resuming of the activities of the United Local Orthodox Church of Ukraine (hereinafter the UL OCU), the promoting of the criminal

neo-imperial doctrine "Russian World" into the Ukrainian ethnocultural space, and so on.

Many domestic scientists actively introduce into the humanitarian space the problem of preserving and introducing the Ukrainian language into all spheres of the social and cultural life of Ukraine. In particular, the works of Yu. Kuzmenko, H. Zalizniak, L. Masenko, Ya. Radevych-Vynnytskyi, O. Tkachenko and others should be singled out.

Thus, Yu. Kuzmenko, in his work "The History of the Ukrainian Language..." emphasises that the radical changes in social relations that have taken place in Ukraine during the years of independence, have led to a significant change in many concepts, including the use of the state language, in particular in production, science, culture, technology, etc. However, the researcher points out that, together with the expansion of the functional boundaries of the Ukrainian language, the resistance of both domestic and foreign supporters of the "Khokhlonization" (a derogatory Russian term for Ukrainians) of Ukraine is growing [6, p. 83].

We would like to note a number of works by L. Masenko and H. Zalizniak. In particular, in the work "Language situation in Kyiv: the Present Day and the Coming Day", the researchers note that the national language is one of the most important factors in the consolidation of the population within the borders of their country. The solidarity of both ethnic and political nations forms, first of all, mass awareness of belonging to one linguistic and cultural community, therefore, spreading of one language in the nation-state is a guarantee of its political stability [4, p. 3].

In turn, the Ukrainian scientist Ya. Radevych-Vynnytskyi emphasises in his monograph “Bilingualism in Ukraine: Theory, History, Language Use” that one of the painful themes for Ukrainians, as well as for many other peoples, is not monolingualism but multilingualism, which most often appears in the form of bilingualism. In Ukraine, this theme has not ceased to be the subject of private, public, and state discussion for many decades, because patriotically-minded Ukrainians are mainly strongly against it, while Ukrainophobes, mankurts, and conformists support bilingualism [9, p. 8].

Corresponding member of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, O. Tkachenko, in the work “Ukrainian Language: Present Day and Historical Perspective”, deals with the Ukrainian language in all the difficulties of its formation, which receive in-depth coverage (geographical, historical, socio-linguistic, cultural, etc.) in the comparison of corresponding situations of other world languages, as well as means of overcoming the crisis moments of their development, emphasises the peculiarity of the current language situation in Ukraine after it gained state independence and analyses the inhibiting factors on the way to achieving its national completeness. In particular, the researcher notes: “The state of the modern Ukrainian literary language is primarily characterised by the fact that nowhere on its own national territory has this language become complete, that is, encompassing not only the entire Ukrainian ethnic (title) nation but also that which is typical for the real nation, as the state language, it also does not unite the Ukrainian political nation, the totality of all citizens of the Ukrainian state, regardless of their national

origin. It is, of course, not about squeezing out the languages of national minorities, but about good knowledge and fluency in the Ukrainian language as the (in general) state language of all citizens of Ukraine, who have to use it as a national and international language.” [10, p. 499].

Many researchers are interested in the theme of resuming UL OCU activity in Ukraine and the progressive development of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Thus, I. Prelovska, in her writings, analyses the prerequisites and consequences of the formation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (hereinafter the UOC), in the conditions of the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter the USSR), and the renewal of the Ukrainian state. The researcher emphasises that the Local Council of the UOC, which took place on November 1-3, 1991, was of great importance for the development of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, however, the non-constructive and anti-Ukrainian policy of the Russian Orthodox Church (hereinafter the ROC) leaders resulted in the failure of the third attempt during the 20<sup>th</sup> century to proclaim the autocephaly of the UOC on canonical grounds and in compliance with all requirements. [8, c. 438].

It is necessary to note the works of V. Kryshchenko, who professionally analyses the geopolitical raiding, conquest, terror, and unification carried out by the ROC and its minions towards Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The scholar of Ukrainian studies also describes the doctrine of the canonical territory of the ROC, which is based on the apologetics of imperial expansionism. In contrast to the criminal activities of the ROC, “preserving the identity of Ukrainian Christianity has always been a sacrificial matter for the entire nation and its spiritual leaders.” [5, p. 256].

A number of Ukrainian scholars are quite professionally engaged in researching the conceptual ideological foundations, the geopolitics of the modern authoritarian rf, the formation and development of the doctrine of the “russian world” and its criminal role in the hybrid russian-Ukrainian war.

V. Yablonskyi, S. Zdioruk, V. Tokman, A. Astafiev, O. Valevskyi, S. Zubchenko, A. Ishchenko, O. Lytvynenko, the scientists of the National Institute of Strategic Studies (hereinafter NISS), in particular, prepared and published in 2014 the analytical report «Ukraine and the Project of the «Russian World,» in which they comprehended the essence and genesis of the political and ideological concept of the «russian world,” revealed the reasons for its creation, emphasised the orientation of the Kremlin’s technology to provide humanitarian support of integration processes in the geopolitical and geoeconomic spheres in the post-Soviet space. The scholars paid special attention to the critical analysis of various mechanisms of “soft power” with the help of which mythologemes of the “russian world” are introduced into Ukrainian society, as well as the attitudes of Ukrainian citizens (critical and non-critical) towards the ideology and ideologues of the “russian world”. Having critically analysed the fundamental essence of the “russian world”, NISS staff offered their own proposals for countering the aggressive influence of the “russian world” ideas on the Ukrainian humanitarian space [14].

In turn, in 2016, scholars of the Research Institute of Ukrainian Studies (hereinafter RIUS) P. Hai-Nyzhnyk (project manager, compiler, and scientific editor), L. Zalizniak, I. Krasnodemska, Yu. Fihurnyi, O. Chyrkov, L. Chuprii published a collective monograph, “Russia’s Aggression

Against Ukraine: Historical Prerequisites and Current Challenges,” where they presented their own view on the historical origins and parallels of the russian aggression against Ukraine and Ukrainians, carried out a well-considered scientific assessment of the rf as an aggressor state and sponsor of international terrorism that used the geopolitical doctrine “russian world” as an important factor in the Kremlin’s revanchist policy against Ukraine, aimed at the total liquidation of Ukrainian statehood, Ukrainian political nation and gradual assimilation of Ukrainian ethnos. After all, the “russian world”, according to the scientists of RIUS, became one of the important factors that led to the unleashing of the undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war that began in 2014 and continues to the present day [1].

In 2016, Ya. Potapenko’s monograph “The Fifth Russian-Ukrainian War: From the Maidan to the Eastern Front (Approaches, Assessments, Interpretations)” was published. The author of the work competently analysed the deep civilizational confrontation between russia and Ukraine, the origins and course of the undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, and the criminal essence of the “russian world” doctrine [7].

The source base of the research is the works and public speeches of apologists, theorists, providers, and supporters of the “russian world”: V. Putin, D. Medvedev, V. Surkov, Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church, D. Tabachnyk, and others, as well as the own observations of one of the authors of this work (Yu. Figurnyi), who was directly involved in Ukrainian ethno-cultural processes at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

**Formulation of the goals of the article (statement of the task).** The purpose of the study is a critical analysis of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which takes place in the conditions of the revanchism policy towards Ukraine and the justification of its periodization. The task of the research is to characterise the historiography of the problem study and the source base; analyse the features of ethnocultural processes at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century; characterise the unique features of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century; summarise research results.

The scientific novelty of the work consists in the development of actual problems, which, despite many publications on this topic, remain insufficiently studied and therefore require further professional studios. Due to our understanding of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we have the opportunity to professionally characterise the essence of the civilizational conflict between autocracy and democracy, its impact on Ukraine and Ukrainians, and possible measures taken by the Ukrainian government and civil society to counter the revanchist threat from russia.

**Presenting the main material.** By starting the study of this important scientific topic, we immediately want to describe the fundamental concepts our research is based on. First of all, Ukrainian ethnocultural processes (ethnocultural development) are a long-term historical development during which, on the territories inhabited by Ukrainians, their own ethnocultural

space forms and a holistic ethnocultural complex emerges and develops, directly and indirectly connected with the common origin of Ukrainians, the functioning of their native language, the creation of an ethnic territory populated by them, the existence of traditional Ukrainian culture, the establishment of the Christian faith, etc. [13, p. 125].

Second, the Ukrainian ethnocultural space is the longtime existence on a certain territory of an original and unique complex of the material and spiritual culture of the Ukrainian people, precisely because of this it has acquired identity and perfection. [13, p. 125-126].

Third, the Ukrainian ethnocultural complex is a set of important ethno-defining features that are directly and indirectly related to the common origin of Ukrainians: the functioning of their native language in their environment; the acquisition and settlement by the Ukrainian people of their own ethnic territory; the development and comprehensive distribution of traditional ethnoculture; the progressive spread of the Christian faith among Ukrainians; the existence of a special mentality and psychotype among them, etc. [13, p. 126].

Fourth, the revanchism of the rf (policy of revanchism) towards Ukraine is the official state policy of the russian establishment, aimed at the total liquidation of Ukrainian statehood and civil nationhood, the return by Russia of its superpower status lost as a result of the Soviet Union dissolution, and the restoration of the so-called USSR 2.0 in the format of "great historical russia."

The end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century became a very important period in the revival of Ukrainian identity and Ukrainianism. The dissolution of the USSR and the restoration of state status by all republics of the former

totalitarian entity gave their people the opportunity to return to democracy and the market economy. However, the post-Soviet countries used this opportunity in different ways. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia implemented a number of important reforms and subsequently became members of the EU and NATO. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan built clan authoritarian regimes. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were involved in a vortex of internal civil and bloody ethnic conflicts. In turn, the rf, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine declared a return to European values and market relations. However, the new leadership of the rf, in the person of B. Eltsin, managed, after some political liberalisation, to stop the real processes of federalization of russia, and since the coming to power of V. Putin, the revival of “great historical russia” and the activation of revanchism towards the former Soviet republics have begun. In Belarus, the autocrat O. Lukashenko, who agreed to create the so-called Union State of russia and Belarus, came to power after the liberal S. Shushkevich. In Moldova, after a short-lived civil war, Transnistria became the russian enclave that retarded the European integration aspirations of Chisinau and attached this former Soviet republic to the geopolitical space of the russian federation for a long time.

Having briefly analysed the dynamics of changes in the former Soviet republics in getting rid of the totalitarian legacy, it can be stated that only Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia managed to go through it quickly and almost painlessly. All other post-Soviet countries had many problems, which, in most cases, were inspired by the rf.

The very idea of creating a political, economic, financial, and cultural project

called the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter the CIS) at the end of 1991 aimed not only to end the existence of the USSR peacefully but also to preserve for the former totalitarian metropolis, and now relatively the liberal rf, the functions of control, grouping, and the development of a joint program of actions in all areas of activity of the participants in this interstate entity.

Although Ukraine did not become a full member of the CIS but only had the status of an observer, the leadership of the rf tried not only to include Kyiv in all its structures but also to purposefully influence the political, economic, financial, cultural, and ethno-cultural processes that took place in our country. Since the research theme is focused on ethnocultural development, we will analyse it solely and, if necessary, involve other factors.

In general, the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society in the conditions of the rf revanchism policy can be conditionally divided into five periods (stages): the first (1991–2004), the second (2005–2009), the third (2010–2013), the fourth (2014–2021), and the fifth (2022–present time).

Both internal and external factors had a great influence on progressive Ukrainian ethnocultural formation. By internal factors, we understand the positive, neutral, or negative influence of the domestic establishment on ethnocultural development, the position towards Ukrainian society in general and civil society in particular. The external elements of influence are primarily characterised by the revanchist policy of the rf towards Ukraine and the actions of Western democracies (the USA, Canada, EU states, and other countries), which, according to their

abilities and capabilities, have contributed and continue to contribute to the reform of our country and systemic ethnocultural creation.

The first period is the most long-lasting and controversial. It begins with the restoration of Ukrainian statehood and ends with the victory of the Orange Revolution. However, among these titanic achievements of national victory, there were a whole series of other achievements, painful defeats, and everyday mundane work in the field of creation ethnoculture. At that time, the external factor was very favourable for Ukraine and Ukrainians. Due to the active support of the Ukrainian diaspora, the governments of Western democracies tried to support complex reforms in Ukraine, providing significant assistance (financial, material, intellectual, informational, etc.) for this purpose. In the 90s of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the leadership of the rf tried to save its state from disintegration, and there was no time for them to engage in active revanchist expansion. Although the suppression of Chechnya absorbed enormous material and human resources, the kremlin tried to maintain its influence on Ukraine, especially in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian language issue took one of the prominent positions in the Ukrainian revival of the second half of the 80s and 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. De jure, the Ukrainian language in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (hereinafter the USSR) occupied a respected place. It was the language of the titular Ukrainian Soviet nation and functioned successfully together with the russian language (the language of international communication in the USSR). However, de facto, the Ukrainian language

was consistently and systematically pushed out of all spheres of public life. One of the authors of this study (Yu. Fihurnyi) witnessed these destructive processes. In his native Zhmerynka (a town of 30,000 people, an administrative centre, and a large railway junction on the Right Bank), which peacefully stretched on Podillya, out of six 10-year secondary schools, only two were Ukrainian-speaking and four were russian-speaking (70s–80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century). In 1987, while getting a job as a truck crane driver at the Artem Industrial Association (Kyiv), when he wrote an application in Ukrainian, they looked at him as if he was an extraterrestrial alien. When he constantly communicated at work only in Ukrainian, he received the nickname «Bandera» from his russian-speaking and surzhik-speaking colleagues. For him, it was a kind of cognitive dissonance, as he lives in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, and speaks his native language, which causes constant non-perception by his colleagues (most of whom are first-generation Kyivans, all of them were born in the Kyiv region), who reward him with an offensive nickname for this.

If during the leadership of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the CC CPU), P. Shelest (July 1963 – May 1972), the author of the cult book «Ukraine Our Soviet» (1970), the Ukrainian language somehow maintained its status, then during the time of his successor, V. Shcherbytskyi (May 1972 – September 1989), it began to rapidly lose its positions in favour of russian. If the official language of meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine under Petro Shelest was Ukrainian, then under Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi it was exclusively



russian. This state of affairs categorically did not suit the passionate part of Ukrainian society (especially the intelligentsia), and with the beginning of the national revival in the second half of the 80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the issue of language preservation has been significantly actualized.

Finally, in the autumn of 1989, the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the law «On Language in the Ukrainian SSR», according to which Ukrainian was declared the state language. Although this law was not perfect, in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century it became a good legislative basis for the preservation and return of the native language in all spheres of social life in Ukraine. The state status of the Ukrainian language helped to stop a full-scale attack of the russian language and gradually, step by step, regain its lost position. Symbolically, if the first President of sovereign Ukraine, L. Kravchuk (1991–1994), was Ukrainian-speaking, then his successor, the so-called «red director,» L. Kuchma (1994–2005), who went to the elections with pro-russian slogans, including the granting official status to the russian language and obtaining presidential regalia, very quickly and radically changed his rhetoric, learned Ukrainian, and began to contribute to the sporadic processes of Ukrainization of post-colonial and post-totalitarian Ukraine. It is clear that Kuchma's Ukrainization was inconsistent and selective. If in the western, central, and northern regions of Ukraine it found strong support and contributed to the full restoration of the Ukrainian ethnocultural space, then in the eastern and southern regions, especially in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukrainization stumbled upon misunderstanding and non-acceptance

both from the side of the regional elite at that time and from the side of the vast majority of russified and russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. After all, 2014 convincingly proved that «russian world» reigned and the russian federation managed to seize these territories, where the positions of the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian ethnocultural space were very weak.

Despite its inconsistency and selectivity, Ukrainization, which took place during the two presidential terms of L. Kuchma, contributed to the significant expansion of the functioning of the Ukrainian language and, accordingly, the strengthening of the Ukrainian ethnocultural space. A significant success on this path was the Ukrainianization of the humanitarian sphere of Ukraine in general and education in particular (preschool, primary, secondary, and higher education). Back in 1991, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the law «On Education», later in 1996, it was revised and began to be effectively implemented in the educational space of Ukraine. This law not only recognized education as an important sphere, the basis for the political, economic, cultural, spiritual, and intellectual development of the state and society, but also tried to ensure the full implementation of the law «On Language in the Ukrainian SSR» in the educational process. Thus, hundreds of schools were opened in Ukraine exclusively with the Ukrainian language of teaching, and thousands of Ukrainian classes were organized in schools with the russian language of teaching.

Gradually, the Ukrainian language returned to the educational process in universities and institutes throughout Ukraine. The process of Ukrainizing the scientific sphere of Ukraine had begun, especially in fundamental and

applied research. Humanitarians got the opportunity to investigate all those problems that were under a tacit ban in the totalitarian era: ethnic formation (the origin of the Ukrainian people), state formation (the victorious rank of Hetman I. Mazepa, National Liberation 1917–1921, the heroic struggle of the UPA, etc.), nation formation (formation of the Ukrainian nation and national identity), and cultural formation (the role of Ukrainian culture in European civilizational development). Ukrainian culture actively began to get rid of the remnants of Sovietism and totalitarianism. The number and nomenclature of books published in Ukrainian have increased. There were also positive trends in the Ukrainian information space: Ukrainian-language mass media (newspapers, magazines, TV channels, radio stations, etc.) are gaining popularity, and the area of their distribution throughout Ukraine is expanding.

In general, the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society in the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century – contributed to the preservation and further development of the Ukrainian ethnocultural complex, despite the significant imperial and totalitarian legacies and the russification of the population of the sovereign state. However, these positive manifestations began to gradually slow down and come to nothing due to the revanchist policy of the new leadership of the rf. With the coming to power in 2000 of a new political clan, the so-called “Piterskie,” led by the young and ambitious V. Putin to replace the ageing and sick B. Eltsin, the situation significantly changed both in russia and beyond. A considerable increase in energy prices, the successful end of the Chechen wars,

the nationalisation of significant political, economic, financial, and informational resources, etc. all contributed to the strengthening of the rf. All this enabled v. putin and his team to start the process of returning russia to its former greatness and power. Ukraine occupied one of the important places in the plans of the russian revanchists. Initially, the kremlin initiated the scandal with the so-called “films of Major Melnichenko”. This political sabotage organised by the russian special services led to a political crisis, a public movement called “Ukraine without Kuchma”, a significant weakening of the presidential power, the curtailment of Ukraine’s European integration and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, and the strengthening Eurasian vector of Bankova. At the same time, the kremlin contributed to the expansion of big russian business in Ukraine through the purchase of enterprises, banks, agricultural production, mass media, etc. After all, the russian language once again began to dominate the information space of Ukraine and flooded TV and radio broadcasts. A powerful russian book publishing industry has captured the book market in Ukraine. There were almost no Ukrainian-language products on book, magazine, or newspaper stalls. Ukrainian-language show business, which in the 1990s became a phenomenon in the cultural life of Ukraine as it proved that by singing exclusively in Ukrainian you can gain fame, popularity, and money, gradually disappeared and was absorbed by russian and russian-speaking pop culture. Someday, the mega-popular “Territory A” on the ICTV TV channel or the successful festival of Ukrainian contemporary music “Chervona Ruta” came to nought. A conspicuous example is the stage fate of the singer Iryna Bilyk, who made a name and

career exclusively on Ukrainian-language songs and then became an “exemplary” russian-language performer. Against this joyless background, the successful performance and victory at the Eurovision Song Contest in 2004 of the singer Ruslana Lyzhychko with the song “Wild Dances” (in English and Ukrainian) became a symbolic sign that Ukrainian-language song has a great deal of potential, you just need to be able to reveal it wisely.

One of the important factors in the ethnocultural formation in Ukraine is the Christian religion, which is filled with Ukrainian meaning and spirit. The illegal re-subordination of the Kyiv Metropolis to the Russian Orthodox Church in 1686 led to the systematic destruction of Ukrainian Orthodoxy for more than three hundred years and the establishment of russian church canons on Ukrainian ethnic lands. The collapse of the USSR revived the religious revival in Ukraine. [5, p. 156]

On the initiative of Archbishop and Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko) of Kiev and Galicia and ROC Exarch of Ukraine, the Hierarchical Council of the ROC on November 22–23, 1990, made a decision to grant the UOC independence in management within the jurisdiction of the ROC. A month later, the First Local Orthodox Church Council of the UOC was held, at which the statute was adopted and Metropolitan Filaret of Kyiv and All Ukraine, was elected as the head of the UOC [8, p. 432–438].

At that time, it was positive thing, as it contributed to the revival of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. However, after the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the Act of Independence of Ukraine on August 24, 1991, this was not enough since, according to Christian church canons, a sovereign

state has the right to have an independent church.

Metropolitan Filaret initiated the Local Council of the UOC in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra on November 1-3, 1991, where a number of important documents were adopted, including an appeal to the leadership of the ROC with a request to grant autonomy and independence to the UOC [8, p. 434–436].

Aware of what a powerful locomotive can become UL OCU for Ukrainian state-building, nation-building, and ethnocultural formation, the leaders of the ROC, using their supporters in Ukraine both openly and secretly, began active actions to delay the process of granting the autocephaly of the UOC, discredit Metropolitan Filaret, neutralise the pro-Ukrainian clergy of the UOC, and return to power the pro-russian clergy [5, p. 159]

Due to the criminal negligence of the authorities at that time, in the person of President L. Kravchuk and law enforcement bodies, including the Security Service of Ukraine, on May 26–27, 1992, an illegal meeting of the hierarchs of the UOC, consisting of 18 bishops, who betrayed Metropolitan Filaret, took place in Kharkiv. Significantly, the convening of this anti-Ukrainian mob was done by Metropolitan Nicodemus (Rusnak) of Kharkiv and Bogodukhiv on the authority of the Synod of the ROC on May 21, 1992. After all, the ROC achieved its goal, and a citizen of the rf, Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) of Rostov and Novocherkassk, was elected by 16 votes to 18 as the head of the UOC instead of Metropolitan Filaret, and the statute of the UOC was changed [8, p. 437].

The removal of Metropolitan Filaret from the position of Primate of the UOC

(in June 1992, the ROC also deprived him of his priestly status) turned the latter from a Ukrainian church organization into an anti-Ukrainian one. Although according to the Constitution, the church in Ukraine is separated from the state, the real Ukrainian state—without the UL UOC—turned into a quasi-state entity. Since the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (hereinafter UOC MP) purposefully and consistently implemented a policy of russification, de-ethnicization, and denationalisation of Ukrainian identity [5, p. 160].

Due to the pro-Ukrainian consolidation activities of Metropolitan Filaret, these metastases could not capture the entire ethnocultural space of Ukraine. Filaret did not bow his head to the enemy. He did not give up and did not sell himself to the ROC like some of his former associates. On June 25, 1992, with the assistance of Metropolitan Filaret, the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Council was held, where the pro-Ukrainian communities of the UOC together with the faithful of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (hereinafter UAOC) established the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (hereinafter referred to as the UOC KP). Patriarch Mstyslav (Skrypnyk) (1992–1993) was elected as its head, and Metropolitan Filaret as his deputy. After the death of the next Primate of the UOC KP, Patriarch Volodymyr (Romaniuk) (1993–1995), on October 22, 1995, Filaret was elected Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine. Understanding how exceptionally important it was for the Ukrainian state to have its own Ukrainian church in spirit and content but not by the name, Patriarch Filaret systematically and purposefully worked on the development of a nationally consolidated Ukrainian Orthodoxy and

the creation of the UL UOC. A true, real assessment of his state and patriotic activity was the imposition of anathema on him by the Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church in 1997. It is important that it was initiated by the leaders of the UOC MP, who hoped to finally destroy the authority of the Primate of the UOC KP [5, p. 160-161].

Therefore, as opposed to the pro-Russian, pro-imperial and revanchist position of the UOC MP, the UOC KP, under the leadership of Patriarch Filaret, began to actively introduce the Ukrainian language, national-patriotic education, and a state-oriented worldview among the clergy and their believers, thereby forming conscious citizens of the Ukrainian state from the post-Soviet population.

Thus, the first period of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society is the longest (1991–2004) and is characterised by both positive and negative trends. Conventionally, it can be divided into two sub-periods, the first (1991–1999) and the second (2000–2004). This division is primarily due to the revanchist policy of the rf towards Ukraine. In the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, since the restoration of Ukrainian statehood, when the national revival actively continued in Ukraine, which began in the second half of the 80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Ukrainian language gradually returned to all spheres of public life, even despite the acute socio-economic crisis. Sporadic Ukrainization began, especially in education, science, the executive, legislative, judicial, and local authorities. Ukrainian culture developed in general, and non-state book publishing, Ukrainian-speaking independent mass media appeared – periodicals, TV channels, radio stations. Ukrainian literature, music, art, theatre, and

cinema got rid of totalitarian restrictions and tried to integrate into the pan-European and world paradigm of development. Except for many objective and subjective factors, this general rise was facilitated by the fact that the Russian Federation at that time was troubled by its purely internal problems and did not have the opportunity to pursue an active revanchist policy towards Ukraine. The Kremlin had some successes, such as the schism of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in 1992 and the transformation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea into an imperial-revanchist Piedmont, but overall the situation was favourable for Ukraine. Everything changed dramatically with the power change in Moscow, the reforms being conducted, the sharp jump in energy prices, and the money from sales that significantly filled the state budget of the RF and allowed those in power to activate revanchist policy towards Ukraine and Ukrainians. First of all, this was manifested in the Kremlin's intervention in Ukrainian affairs, the cassette scandal related to the films of Major Melnichenko, the conflict around Tuzla, the purchase of Ukrainian assets by big Russian business, the halting of Ukrainization and increasing of russification in all spheres of social life in Ukraine, including the narrowing of the Ukrainian ethnocultural space functioning.

In our opinion, the second period of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society was the response of Ukrainians to the active strengthening of the revanchist policy of the RF towards Ukraine. In the autumn of 2004, another presidential election was to take place in Ukraine. The Kremlin, through its agents and the so-called "fifth column", tried to prevent the victory of the pro-Ukrainian, pro-European democrat V. Yushchenko

and attempted to bring to power the pro-Russian autocrat V. Yanukovich. The government at that time, represented by L. Kuchma, actively supported the Kremlin's plans, but a passionate part of Ukrainians destroyed the plans of the revanchists. The Orange Revolution, which stopped the dismantling of the Ukrainian state (Moscow tried to separate from Ukraine southeastern regions, including Crimea), restored law and order in Ukrainian society (the falsified results of the second round of the presidential elections were cancelled and fair re-elections were held, which were won by V. Yushchenko). The vast majority of Ukrainians hoped that the newly elected president would activate Ukraine's European integration and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, implement and complete required reforms in the political, economic, financial, informational, military, cultural, spiritual, and other spheres of public life of the Ukrainian state. However, it did not happen as expected. Despite his positive human virtues, V. Yushchenko turned out to be a weak politician. He made his first official visit not to Brussels or Washington but to Moscow. All those who falsified the expression of will in the presidential elections and those who called for the dismemberment of Ukraine in 2004 were not punished according to the legislation of Ukraine; corruption, clanism, and the oligarchy actively developed and flourished. As a result of the active actions of Kremlin agents and own miscalculations, the united presidential team fell apart, V. Yushchenko and Yu. Tymoshenko began mutual strife, as a result of which V. Yanukovich "resurrected" from political oblivion and restored his lost social and political positions. Domestic political defeats were supplemented by miscalculations in the

international arena as well: Ukraine failed to obtain an action plan for membership in the Alliance at the summit of NATO member states in Bucharest in 2008, Ukraine's European integration intentions progressed very slowly, and V. Yushchenko's efforts to achieve autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church failed.

Unfortunately, the years of V. Yushchenko's presidency (23.01.2005–25.02.2010) did not become a history of victorious successes in the field of Ukrainian state-building and nation-building. However, quite significant achievements have been made in the creation of ethnoculture and the understanding of one's own history. One of these achievements was, in our firm belief, the recognition at the state level of the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine as genocide against the Ukrainian people.

In our opinion, this has become an established fact, precisely because of the purposeful and consistent work of V. Yushchenko, the President of Ukraine, and the problem of understanding the Holodomor-genocide has taken a prominent place in the public discourse.

Thus, in the Law of Ukraine № 376-V "On the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine", which was prepared with his active support and officially approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on November 30, 2006, in particular, it is stated: "Article 1. The Holodomor of 1932–1933 years in Ukraine is genocide of the Ukrainian people. Article 2. The public denial of the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine is recognised as an insult to the memory of millions of victims of the Holodomor, a humiliation of the dignity of the Ukrainian people and is illegal. Article 3. State authorities and local self-government bodies, in accordance with their powers,

are obliged to: participate in the formation and implementation of state policy in the field of restoration and preservation of the national memory of the Ukrainian people; to promote the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness and culture, the dissemination of information about the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine among the citizens of Ukraine and the world public, to ensure the study of the tragedy of the Holodomor in educational institutions of Ukraine; to take measures to perpetuate the memory of the victims and victims of the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine, including the construction of memorials in populated areas and the installation of commemorative signs to the victims of the Holodomor; to ensure in the prescribed manner access of scientific and public institutions and organizations, scientists, individual citizens who are researching the problems of the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine and its consequences, to archival and other materials on issues related to the Holodomor" [2, p. 10].

This extremely important legislative act made it possible for domestic scientists to start complex and systematic research on such an important and complicated subject, and for citizens of Ukraine to realise the depth of the abyss into which the Ukrainian peasantry was thrown.

V. Yushchenko paid great attention to the historical memory recovery and national monuments restoration destroyed during Ukraine's three-century stateless existence. With his active assistance, the Palace of Hetman Kirill Razumovsky was restored, the Kruty Heroes Memorial museum complex and the National Historical and Cultural Reserve "Hetman's Glory" in Baturin were opened, and more.

The introduction of compulsory dubbing of foreign films into Ukrainian in 2006 was a significant achievement during the presidency of V. Yushchenko. This important issue was to be resolved by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine № 20 “Some Issues of the Order of Distribution and Demonstration of Films” dated January 16, 2006, on the compulsory dubbing and subtitling of all foreign films in Ukrainian. According to this resolution, Ukrainian dubbing was to be introduced gradually: from September 1, 2006, at least 20% of films with Ukrainian dubbing had to be done, from January 1, 2007 – at least 50%, and from July 1, 2007 – at least 70%. This decision was supported by Ukrainian film distributors (at that time they occupied 70% of the film distribution market), who worked directly with the Hollywood majors since it was the major that paid the cost of the translation into Ukrainian language on their own, and met with hostility the divisions of Russian film distribution companies (at that time they controlled 30% of the film distribution market), which indirectly bought the rights to show foreign films in Ukraine from Russian companies. It is worth noting that the entire Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and one of the main ideologues of the Putin regime, Vladyslav Surkov, opposed the introduction of Ukrainian duplication, and in Ukraine, this issue was tried to be promoted by the then Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine for Humanitarian Affairs from the Party of Regions of Ukraine, Dmytro Tabachnyk [3].

On the vivid example of the spreading of the Ukrainian language in the domestic film distribution business during the presidency of V. Yushchenko, we understand that for the highest leadership

of the Russian Federation, the stigmatisation and reduction of the area of functioning of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and the simultaneous expansion of the Russian language became an important element of the Kremlin's revanchist policy.

The most important factor in the revanchism of the Russian Federation was the neo-imperial geopolitical ideological doctrine of the “Russian World”, the criminal essence of which is the theoretical justification and practical restoration of “Great Historical Russia” within the borders of the Russian Empire at the peak of its power in 1914 [12, p. 75].

The Orange Revolution of 2004 was a powerful challenge for Russia and its establishment. Realising that Ukraine can become a model and guide both for Russia and for other post-Soviet republics on the path of democratisation, westernisation, and liberalisation, V. Putin initiated the process of developing and forming a new ideology that would help restore the newest modernised Russian superpower state. It was “Russian World” that was to become such an ideological doctrine or its important component [11, p. 45].

“Russian World” eventually became a convenient tool, first for peaceful promotion under cover of preserving and developing the Russian language, culture, and values of the Russian Orthodox Church, primarily neo-imperial revanchist slogans regarding the restoration of the territorial value of “Great Historical Russia”, and later the final liquidation of the independent states that were formed on the basis of the former Soviet republics, the gradual assimilation of their populations, and the return of the superpower status of the Russian Federation in the near future. For these purposes, the RF supported

pro-russian forces in Ukraine in every possible way (politically, economically, financially, etc.) and prepared a reliable basis for them to return to power.

Consequently, the second period of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society under the conditions of the strengthening of russia's policy of revanchism towards Ukraine is characterised by both positive and negative trends. As for the positives, this is, first of all, the gradual increase in the influence of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of life in Ukrainian society, especially in preschool, primary, secondary, and higher education institutions, in scientific institutions, literary and artistic events, cultural construction, cinematography, etc. Pro-Ukrainian authorities of that time, under the leadership of the third President of Ukraine, V. Yushchenko, actualized the public's attention to the return of historical memory to the Ukrainian people by revealing the terrible truth about the Holodomor-genocide of 1932–1933 with the help of scientific research. In turn, the leadership of the rf, in order to preserve its authoritarian power in russia and opposition to democratic transformations in Ukraine (the Orange Revolution of 2004), intensified its own anti-Ukrainian policy, by supporting politically, economically, financially, and culturally pro-russian forces in Ukraine and creating the neo-imperial geopolitical doctrine “russian world”, launching a full-scale attack on Ukrainian ethnocultural space with its help.

**Conclusions.** Thus, having analysed the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society under the conditions of russian revanchism towards Ukraine in the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, we came to the following conclusions. First of

all, understanding the periodization of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society in the conditions of the revanchist course of the rf to restore its imperial power, helps to develop professional conclusions from the achievements and from the mistakes made to improve the sustainable development of Ukraine and Ukrainians on the path of Euro-Atlantic integration. Second, the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society under the conditions of the revanchist-imperial policy of the rf can be conditionally divided into five periods (stages): the first (1991–2004), the second (2005–2009), the third (2010–2013), the fourth (2014–2021), and the fifth (2022 – present). Third, the first period of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society is the longest and is characterised by both positive and negative trends. Conventionally, it can be divided into two sub-periods, the first (1991–1999) and the second (2000–2004). This division is primarily due to the revanchist policy of the russian federation towards Ukraine, since in 1991–1999 the kremlin was solving its own socio-political problems and could not fully pay attention to Ukraine. After the coming to power of V. Putin and the significant improvement of the political, economic, and financial situation in the rf, the russian authorities considerably increased their anti-Ukrainian influence on the Ukrainian ethnocultural space. Fourth, the second period of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society is determined by the further expansion of the functioning of the Ukrainian language in social and political life, the educational process, in the fields of science, literature, art, culture, the film industry, etc. V. Yushchenko's increased attention to humanitarian problems helped to activate scientific research and return



historical memory to Ukrainians, especially about the Holodomor-genocide of 1932–33. At the same time, the kremlin, realising the danger of promoting the ideals and achievements of the Orange Revolution in the post-Soviet space, made considerable efforts to discredit and stigmatise it, using for this the newly created non-imperial revanchist doctrine-concept of “russian world”. Fifth, there is an urgent need for further analytical understanding of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society in the conditions of the purposeful policy of russian revanchism towards Ukraine in the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. This is especially true for the investigation of the criminal, pro-russian, pro-imperial, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-state activities of the ROC and its satellite in Ukraine, the UOC MP. Sixth, for the final victory over the russian aggressor and the restoration of the unity of the Ukrainian state, it is necessary to use all available factors: military, geopolitical, diplomatic, political, economic, financial, sacral-spiritual, ethnocultural, intellectual, etc., in the name of building a democratic, spiritual, legal, innovative, wealthy, and powerful Ukrainian Independent United State!

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In general, the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society in the 90s of the 20th century – the beginning of the 21st century – contributed to the preservation and further development of the Ukrainian ethnocultural complex, despite the significant imperial and totalitarian legacies and the russification of the population of the sovereign state.