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ЕТНОКУЛЬТУРНИЙ РОЗВИТОК УКРАЇНСЬКОГО СУСПІЛЬСТВА В УМОВАХ НЕОГОЛОШЕНОЇ РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ГІБРИДНОЇ ВІЙНИ

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Анотація. У статті проаналізовано етнокультурний розвиток українського соціуму в умовах неоголошеної російсько-української гібридної війни. З'ясовано, що четвертий етап етнокультурного розвитку українського суспільства (20.02.2014 – 23.02.2022 рр.) відзначився кардинальною зміною політики російської влади, а саме відбувся перехід від задіяння «м'якої сили» («русского мира») до застосування «жорсткої сили» (анексія Кримського півострова, так звана «русская весна», та вторгнення російських військ на територію Донецької й Луганської областей України), а все це разом призвело до початку воєнних дій. Зазначено, що неоголошена російсько-українська гібридна війна виявилася не звичайною військовою конфронтацією, а цивілізаційним протистоянням, але його гібридність (вміле маскуванню кремлем своїх агресивних планів; успішне розгортання потужної пропагандистської кампанії щодо відбілювання власної репутації в Європі й у світі; цинічні звинувачення України у розв'язуванні громадянської війни та вчинення геноциду проти населення Донбасу тощо) дала можливість російському керівництву проводити цілеспрямовану зовнішню й внутрішню політику та намагання примусити Україну до миру на власних засадах. Виявлено, що, незважаючи на поразки на полі бою (Львовийськ, Дебальцево тощо), тимчасову втрату Криму та окремих регіонів Донецької й Луганської областей, українці вистояли і зберегли державність. Обґрунтовано, що одним із головних чинників цієї стійкості стала українізація України в кінці ХХ – на початку ХХІ ст. та наявність власного етнокультурного простору. З'ясовано, що українська мова й українська етнічна та національна ідентичності, українська культура і ментальність не лише згуртували громадян України для відсічі російської агресії, а й поступово започаткували процес реального, а не формального творення української політичної нації. Доведено, що політика, економіка, військово, освіта, культура, наука, мистецтво, спорт тощо, наповнені україноцентричними сенсами, розпочали системне творення в умовах неоголошеної російсько-української гібридної війни нового цивілізаційного проекту – Україна ХХІ століття.

Ключові слова: Україна; українці; етнокультурний розвиток українського суспільства; неоголошена російсько-українська гібридна війна; реваншизм; «русский мир».

ETHNOCULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE UNDECLARED RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN HYBRID WAR

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Annotation. *The article analyses the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society under the conditions of the undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war. It was found that the fourth stage of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society (February 20, 2014–February 23, 2022) was marked by a radical change in the policy of the russian government, namely, a transition from the use of "soft power" ("russian peace") to the use of "hard power" (the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the so-called "russian spring," and the invasion of russian troops into the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine), and all this together led to the start of hostilities. It is noted that the undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war turned out not to be an ordinary military confrontation but a civilizational confrontation, but its hybridity (the kremlin's skillful deception of its aggressive plans; the successful deployment of a powerful propaganda campaign to whiten its own reputation in Europe and the world; cynical accusations against Ukraine of launching civil war and genocide against the population of Donbas, etc.) allowed the russian leadership to pursue a purposeful foreign and domestic policy and to try to force Ukraine to peace on its own terms. It was revealed that despite the defeats on the battlefield (Illovaisk, Debaltsevo, etc.), the temporary loss of Crimea and certain regions of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Ukrainians persisted and preserved statehood. It is substantiated that one of the main factors in this stability was the Ukrainization of Ukraine at the end of the 20th century—at the beginning of the 21st century and the presence of its own ethnocultural space. It was found that the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian ethnic and national identity, Ukrainian culture and mentality not only united the citizens of Ukraine in repelling russian aggression but gradually initiated the process of real, not formal, creation of the Ukrainian political nation. It has been proven that politics, economy, military, education, culture, science, art, sports, etc. filled with Ukrainian-centric meanings started the systematic creation in the conditions of the undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war of a new civilizational project: Ukraine of the 21st century.*

Key words: *Ukraine; Ukrainians; ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society; undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war; revanchism; "russian world".*

The problem statement. Ukrainian national revolution at the beginning of the 21st century is a critical moment for the state-building, nation-building, and ethnocultural progress of Ukraine. A passionate part of the Ukrainian people managed to repel the attack of revanchist pro-russian forces in Ukraine. Eurasian integration processes, in which the authorities of the russian federation (hereinafter referred to as the rf) actively tried to involve the Ukrainian state during 2010–2014 were stopped, and the Euro-Atlantic vector of the Ukrainian society's development became dominant and timely again. These revolutionary events became an existential challenge for the russian neo-imperial establishment,

to which it had to respond. However, if, at the turn of 2004–2005, the russian revanchists limited themselves exclusively to moral and financial assistance to their puppets in Ukraine, then the fateful events of the Ukrainian winter of 2013–2014 russians and their proxies met well prepared. At first, they seized Crimea, launched anti-Ukrainian activities in the East and South of Ukraine (the so-called "russian spring"), created terrorist quasi-state entities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the so-called "Donetsk People's Republic" (hereinafter "DPR") and "Luhansk People's Republic" (hereinafter "LPR"), and eventually russian occupation military units entered Ukrainian territory.

In turn, the pro-Ukrainian forces managed to rally, unite, and, thanks to the powerful voluntary and volunteer movements, stopped the rashist invaders and their terrorist accomplices. Although, tactically, the russian revanchist forces achieved some success in Ukraine (seizure of Crimea, creation of terrorist enclaves “DPR” and “LPR”, etc.), the russians lost strategically, because the Ukrainian state survived and the Ukrainian political nation became a *fait accompli*.

The relevance of the declared topic is primarily determined by the understanding of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society in the conditions of the undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation, the active counteracting of Ukrainians to the attempts of the rashists and their accomplices to dismember and liquidate the Ukrainian state, to destroy the Ukrainian identity and the Ukrainian political nation, and forcefully impose the russian statehood, the russian language, and russianness.

Analysis of recent sources, research, and publications. Characterising the professional research in which a solution to this problem was launched, we can state that the systematic study of the impact of the neo-imperial policy of Putin’s revanchism on ethnocultural processes in modern Ukraine has not yet become a complex object of scientific research. However, some important aspects of this problem are being studied by scientists. In particular, the following researchers consider the problem of the russian federation’s hybrid aggression against Ukraine, its reasons, the course of the events, and its impact on modern socio-political, sociocultural, religious, and cultural processes in their works: Antonov-Ovsienko, A. Astafiev, N. Bezsmertna, T. Berezovets, A. Boiko, N. Brekhunets,

P. Burkovskiy, Yu. Butusov, O. Valevskiy, V. Vasylenko, O. Vysoven, O. Vlasyk, Yu. Voitenko, O. Hazizova, P. Hai-Nyzhnyk, K. Halushko, O. Haran, M. Herheliuk, V. Holovchenko, V. Horbulin, M. Hrabovska, S. Hrabovskiy, B. Demianenko, V. Demianenko, M. Doroshko, O. Yeriemieiev, O. Zadorozhnii, L. Zaliznyak, S. Zdioruk, S. Zubchenko, A. Ivanets, A. Ishchenko, S. Kagamlyk, O. Kalinovska, O. Kashpor, L. Kotsur, I. Krasnodemska, V. Krysachenko, O. Kryshtopa, O. Lytvenenko, Ye. Lianova, T. Lohvyniuk, V. Lozovyi, I. Losiev, O. Liashenko, Ye. Mahda, L. Masenko, V. Morokko, V. Molotkina, K. Nastoiasha, L. Otroshko, P. Pavlenko, B. Parakhovskiy, M. Piren, Ya. Potapenko, R. Potapenko, I. Rushchenko, O. Sahan, I. Sydor, B. Sokolov, L. Sorochuk, M. Slaboshpytskiy, I. Todorov, Ya. Tynchenko, V. Tkachenko, V. Tkach, V. Tokman, Yu. Feltyshtynskiy, L. Filipovych, Yu. Fihurnyi, L. Khmelnytska, O. Chirkov, L. Chuprii, T. Chuhlib, O. Shakurova, V. Yablonskiy, G. Yavorska, L. Yakubova and others.

Despite these published works, the problem of studying the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society during the undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war remains relevant and requires further scientific study.

Statement of the task. The purpose of the study is a comprehensive analysis of the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society during the undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war from February 2014 up to February 24, 2022, namely the full-scale invasion of Russian troops into the Ukrainian state. The task of the research is to: describe the historiography of the study of the problem; analyse the peculiarities of the language legislation and the functioning of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine

during this period; reveal the importance of the religious factor in the ethnocultural development of the Ukrainian nation; and identify changes that took place and had a positive impact on Ukrainian ethnocultural processes from the beginning of 2014 until the beginning of 2022.

The scientific novelty of the work is in developing current problems, which, despite numerous related publications, remain insufficiently studied and therefore require further professional studies.

Presenting the main material. As we begin the study of this important scientific topic, we immediately want to characterise the fundamental concepts on which our research is based. First, the “undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war” is, first of all, an existential confrontation between the Eurasian russian neo-empire and the European Ukrainian state. Its ontology is a civilizational conflict between the autocratic russian revanchist regime and democratic Ukraine. This war is characterised by the following specific features: complexity (a combination of geopolitical, geostrategic, geoeconomic, geocultural, socio-political, socio-political, socio-cultural, ethnocultural, ideological, religious, national, ethnic, territorial, economic, cultural and other weighty factors), hybridity (by using traditional and non-traditional, state and non-state, ordinary and unusual means, methods, tools, techniques, etc. with the aim to achieve certain global and regional tasks), and uncertainty (existence in real time of war and peace, anti-terrorist operation and peaceful life, problems of ways to return Ukrainian territories temporarily occupied by russia, etc.).

Secondly, “Ukrainization” is a consecutive and systematic activity of the Ukrainian state, aimed at introducing the Ukrainian

language, culture, mentality and Ukraine-loving into all spheres of life in society.

The fourth period of ethnocultural development in Ukrainian society began during the Ukrainian National Revolution at the beginning of the 21st century and continued under the conditions of an undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war. During these eight years (February 2014 – February 2022), Ukraine has overcome a path that, under normal conditions, would have taken decades. Autocrat v. putin has repeatedly emphasised when meeting with world politicians that Ukraine is a “failed state”, an incapacitated ghost state. Therefore, by starting a covert aggression against Ukraine, he hoped for an easy victory. However, it turned out that Ukrainization for almost a quarter of a century made a huge contribution to Ukrainian state formation, nation formation, and the formation of ethnoculture. Ukrainianness prevailed to a greater or lesser extent there, where it was introduced into all spheres of life. In those regions, where Ukrainization existed only formally, on paper, primarily in Crimea and the densely populated urban agglomerations of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, “russian peace” blossomed into a poisonous and intoxicating potion. Where Ukrainian-language education (pre-school, primary, secondary, and higher education) worked at full capacity, where Ukrainian-centric culture (traditional, classical, modern) was created, and where communication with God was in Ukrainian, the Ukrainian ethnocultural space successfully functioned and developed, which in turn helped to form national identity among ordinary citizens of Ukraine. They became the critical mass that initially stopped the “russian spring” in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine and then finally closed the revanchist project

“Novorossia”. Tragically, the revolutionary ruling team led by the Acting President of Ukraine, O. Turchynov (23.02–07.06.2014), was not at its best. Their hesitancy and incoherence led to the loss of Crimea and the deployment of fighting in Donbas.

With the election of P. Poroshenko as the fifth President of Ukraine (June 7, 2014 – May 20, 2019), the situation improved significantly. The military advances of the Russian occupation forces and their proxies in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions were stopped and localised. Ukraine gained significant support in Europe and the world, and substantial sanctions were imposed on Russia. The European integration and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Ukrainian state intensified. On June 27, 2014, the Association Agreement with the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the EU) was signed in Brussels, and on June 11, 2017, Ukrainians finally received the right to visa-free travel to EU countries. P. Poroshenko also paid attention to humanitarian issues. On September 5, 2017, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law “On Education”, which was soon signed by Petro Oleksiiovych. The new law initiated a comprehensive educational reform: a twelve-year secondary education, Ukrainian is determined as the main language of teaching; national minorities have the right to study subjects in their native language only up to the fifth grade; and starting from the sixth grade, the entire educational process is provided in Ukrainian only. Although this is quite a revolutionary decision, it caused the rejection by the politicians of some European countries, namely Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania; however, it finally dotted the i’s and crossed the t’s in the confrontation in the educational process between Ukrainian and Russian languages, in favour of the first [6].

During 2014–2021, the agenda of both the government and society included the issue of the Ukrainian language. The language law of 2012, valid at that time, significantly narrowed the functioning of Ukrainian and significantly expanded the spread of Russian. Therefore, already on February 23, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine cancelled it, but the Acting President of Ukraine, the so-called “bloody pastor” O. Turchynov, refused to ratify the decision of the parliament, explaining by the fact that the cancellation of this language law could lead to an escalation of riots in the south and east of Ukraine, and until a new language law is prepared and adopted, the old one will function.

The newly elected President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, acknowledged that the abolition of the “kivalov-kolesnichenko” law was a mistake and promised the society to improve the language policy. Since the language issue was not a priority for Petro Oleksiiovych either, the final decision in this case was delayed for years. The issue of the constitutional status of the Law of Ukraine “On the Basics of State Language Policy” was considered in the offices of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine for three long years (from February 2015 to February 2018), and only on February 28, 2018, respected judges recognised it as unconstitutional and invalid [2].

This decision allowed P. Poroshenko to sign the Decree on May 31, 2018, “On Immediate Measures to Strengthen the State Status of the Ukrainian Language and Promote the Creation of a Single Cultural Space of Ukraine.” Accordingly, the approval of the goal-oriented programme for 2018–2028 aimed at ensuring the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language in all spheres of public life, the formation of a single cultural space, and the preservation

of the integrity of the culture of Ukraine was foreseen [6].

The highest achievement of P. Poroshenko's humanitarian policy was the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as a State Language", adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on April 25, 2019. It was adopted by 278 votes of people's deputies; 38 voted against, 7 abstained, and 25 did not vote. It was signed by the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Andrii Parubii, on May 14, 2019, and by the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, on May 15. On May 16, 2019, the law was published in the parliamentary newspaper "Voice of Ukraine", and already on July 16, 2019, two months after its publication, it entered into force. The law ensured the priority of the Ukrainian language in more than thirty spheres of public life, in particular in state administration, mass media, education, science, culture, advertising, services, etc. At the same time, it is flexible enough for the use of other languages alongside the Ukrainian one and does not interfere in private communication [1].

Its most important provisions are: 1) the state status of the Ukrainian language is an inseparable element of the constitutional system of Ukraine as a unitary state (Article (hereinafter – Art.) 1, part (hereinafter – p.) 3); 2) the Ukrainian language, as the only state language, performs the functions of the language of interethnic communication, is a guarantee of the human rights protection for every Ukrainian citizen regardless of his ethnic origin, and is also a factor of the unity and national security of Ukraine (Art. 1, p. 8); 3) the effect of this Law does not extend to the sphere of private communication and the performance of religious ceremonies (Art. 2, p. 2.); 4) the state organizes free Ukrainian language courses for adults

and provides an opportunity to freely master the state language for citizens of Ukraine who did not have such an opportunity (Art. 6, p. 3); 5) Art. 9, 10 and 11 determine an extremely wide range of persons for whom proficiency in the state language is mandatory; the requirements for the level of their command of the state language are the same; 6) no one can be forced to use a language other than Ukrainian while at work and performing duties under the employment contract (Article 20, p. 1). It is forbidden to require knowledge of a language other than the state one when applying for a job; 7) printed media may be published in languages other than the state language, provided that at the same time with the corresponding edition of the publication in a foreign language, the circulation of this publication is published in the state language (Art. 25, p. 1); 8) in each place of distribution of printed media (hereinafter referred to as mass media), printed media in the state language must make up at least 50 percent of the names of printed media distributed in this place (Art. 25, p. 4); 9) norms of Art. 25 do not apply, in particular, to publications in the languages of indigenous peoples, including the Crimean Tatar language, and to such publications as "Kyiv Post", which is published in English and is intended for foreign-language readers who have not yet mastered the state language; 10) a publisher entered in the State Register of Publishers of Ukraine, producers and distributors of published products, is obliged to publish in the state language at least 50 percent of all the titles of book publications published by him during the corresponding calendar year (Art. 26, p1); 11) the share of book publications in the state language in the total number of titles of book publications available for sale in each bookstore or other institution engaged in book distribution

must not less than 50 percent (Art. 26, p. 2); 2) new articles or updated approaches are Art. 27 “State Language in the Field of User Interfaces of Computer Programmes and Websites”, Art. 28 “State Language in the Field of Information for General Information”, Art. 29 “State Language in the Field of Public Events”; 13) extremely important is Art. 30 “State Language in the Field of Consumer Services”, which is the Ukrainian language. At the client’s request, his personal service can also be provided in another language acceptable to the parties (p. 3). This means that the first address of a service employee must be in Ukrainian, and in the case of a client’s request, he has the right but is not obliged to switch to another language, and it will not be a violation if he switches. Because the main thing is to ensure the spread of the state language in all public spheres of life and to ensure the constitutional right of citizens to receive services in the Ukrainian language. Therefore, the law provides rules on the procedure for imposing fines on business entities for violating the law on the use of the state language in the field of consumer service; 14) the provision “Language Acceptable to the Parties” is used according to the same principle in other areas, in particular, in health care and transport [1].

This law, according to Art. 12 of the Constitution of Ukraine, emphasises that Ukraine takes care of the satisfaction of the national, cultural, and language needs of Ukrainians living outside the state, provides the opportunity to take measures to master the state language by representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora, and also establishes the obligation of proficiency in the state language for a person who aspires to receive the Certificate of Ukrainian Living Abroad. In general, the law enters into force 2 months after publication, and a number of separate provisions are

postponed for 6 months, 2 years, 3 years, and even more than 10 years, such as: “The language of an independent external assessment performed following the completion of secondary education, as well as that of entrance examinations, shall be the state language, except for an independent external assessment of knowledge of foreign languages.” (enters into force on January 1, 2030) [1].

The Law also involves the establishing of the National Commission on State Language Standards (a central executive body that will process and approve the standards of the Ukrainian language as the state language) and the appointment of the Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language, a civil servant who, together with his team, will monitor compliance with the norms of the Law [1].

The importance of the language law was confirmed by the expected reaction of the kremlin. Diplomats of the rf suggested that the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter the UN) convene a meeting on May 20, 2019 to condemn the Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language”, but this authority refused to consider this issue at the meeting [1].

The undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war once again demonstrated to Ukrainians the importance of the religious factor in general and the urgent need to have its own autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine, which will be Ukrainian not in words, not on plates and in official documents, but primarily in its own affairs. It will have a Ukrainian-centric essence and act not in the interests of the aggressor state but exclusively for the welfare of the Ukrainian people.

The President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, understood the importance of the

existence of the United Local Orthodox Church in Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the UL OCU) for Ukraine and Ukrainians and made tremendous efforts to create it.

For the first time, P. Poroshenko personally met with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I during his visit to Istanbul on March 19, 2016. After the meeting, the Ukrainian President announced that he discussed with the patriarch “the single local church that the Ukrainian people are aspiring to and are waiting for.” Bartholomew I, in turn, promised to “pray for peace and unity in Ukraine.” Later on, in April, P. Poroshenko appealed to the Primate of the Romanian Orthodox Church, His Holiness Patriarch Daniel, with a request to support and facilitate the realisation of the desire of Ukrainians to have an UL OCU. On April 9, 2018, President Poroshenko met with Bartholomew I at his official residence again. Already on April 17, P. Poroshenko officially appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I with a request to “grant the Tomos on autocephaly to the Ukrainian local Orthodox Church.” On April 19, 2018, deputies of the Verkhovna Rada supported the resolution supporting the President’s appeal to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I on granting the Tomos on the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. During his speech in parliament, P. Poroshenko emphasised that obtaining autocephaly by the Orthodox Church in Ukraine will not mean that it will become a state church. He noted that he had received a corresponding appeal from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (hereinafter referred to as the UOC KP) and from the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (hereinafter UAOC) and stressed that this newly created church will be independent from Moscow [6].

Poroshenko, together with the hierarchs, clergy, and believers of the UOC KP and UAOC, persistently and systematically consolidated Ukrainians around the idea of creating the UL OCU. Finally, these efforts were crowned with the first successes. On October 11, 2018, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate decided to grant autocephaly to Ukrainian Orthodoxy. According to this final document, the Synodal Letter of 1686 on the temporary transfer to the Russian Orthodox Church (hereinafter referred to as the ROC), the right to appoint metropolitans of Kyiv is revoked. The most important thing is that from now on, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has declared its right to the canonical territory of Ukraine, thereby finally withdrawing it from the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church. According to this decision, the Russian Orthodox Church not only completely loses Ukraine with its parishes and profits but also turns from a leading Orthodox church organisation into an ordinary one, and this is of great importance for Ukrainians, their consolidation and final victory over the aggressor in the conditions of an undeclared Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war [12, p. 571–572].

The Unification Council of the bishops of the UOC KP, UAOC, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (hereinafter referred to as the UOC MP), where Metropolitan Epiphany was elected as a Primate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the OCU), was held in Kyiv on December 15, 2018. On January 6, 2019, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I presented Tomos to the newly elected leader, and thereby Ukraine finally got its own sovereign autocephalous Ukrainian church again. It is noteworthy that the Ecumenical Patriarch

recognised all Orthodox church organisations in Ukraine—the UOC KP, the UAOC, and the UOC MP—as canonical, thereby promoting them in equal dialogue and consolidation, which eventually contributed to the creation and development of the OCU [12, p. 572].

A self-sufficient Ukrainian state must definitely have its own autocephalous church, which will become an effective factor in the formation of a highly spiritual Christian Ukraine and the Ukrainian ethnocultural space.

In the 1990s and 2000s, Ukrainian films practically were not produced or released. During these years, there were rare cases of successful Russian-Ukrainian co-production of exclusively Russian-speaking films, in which Ukraine was only a co-producer. The situation has radically changed since 2014, when the renaissance of Ukrainian-language culture began and the Ukrainian state financially supported the revival of Ukrainian cinema. Starting in 2014, when the first Ukrainian blockbuster “The Guide” was released, Ukrainian films began to collect a considerable box office in Ukrainian film distribution. In 2018, for the first time in history, Ukrainian films entered the top twenty highest-grossing films in the Ukrainian film distribution, following the results of 2018 [11].

Important changes began to take place in the Ukrainian information space, namely in television and radio broadcasting. On June 16, 2016, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Television and Radio Broadcasting” (on the proportion of songs in the state language in music radio programmes and radio broadcasts)”, and on July 7, 2016, P. Poroshenko signed it. On October 18, 2016, representatives of the largest

Ukrainian radio groups signed in the premises of the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting the “Memorandum on the Application of the Requirements of the Legislation on the Proportion of Songs in the State Language and the Proportion of Broadcasting in the State Language”. And already on November 8, 2016, this Law entered into force and officially introduced quotas for Ukrainian-language songs and Ukrainian-language programmes at radio stations. According to the law, quotas are introduced gradually over three years. But as of November 8, 2016, radio stations will be obliged to broadcast at least 25% of songs in Ukrainian in the time intervals between 7 a.m. and 2 p.m. and between 3 p.m. and 10 p.m. and to conduct at least 50% of programmes in Ukrainian during the day. In general, the law provides: to set a thirty-five percent quota for songs in the Ukrainian language for the time intervals between 7 a.m. and 2 p.m. and between 3 p.m. and 10 p.m.; the quota is introduced gradually: during the first year – 25%, the second – 30%, the third – 35%; for radio stations that speak more than 60% of the product in EU languages according to the licence, a preferential quota of 25% is set for songs in the Ukrainian language; the quota for broadcasting in Ukrainian language is 60%; the quota for the language of broadcasting is also introduced gradually: during the first year – 50%, the second – 55%, the third – 60% [5].

On May 23, 2017, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the Law “On Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine on Broadcasting of Audiovisual (Electronic) Media.” It was signed by the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, A. Parubii, on May 26 and by the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, on June 6. This law established mandatory weekly quotas for

broadcasting films in the Ukrainian language on Ukrainian television. It is about 75% of the state language for national and regional TV channels, 60% for local ones, as well as 75% of the state language for news programmes on Ukrainian television. The law establishes the following quotas for programmes and films in the Ukrainian language on Ukrainian TV channels: for national and regional broadcast (analogue and digital) TV channels, as well as satellite TV channels rebroadcast by the providers in more than one region: 75% of Ukrainian language programmes and/or films per week in each of the time intervals between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m. and between 6 p.m. and 10 p.m.; for local terrestrial (analogue and digital) TV channels, satellite TV channels that are rebroadcast by providers of only one region, as well as TV channels of other technological types of broadcasting (for example, cable): 60% of programmes and/or films in Ukrainian language per week in each of the time intervals between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m. and between 6 p.m. and 10 p.m.; for all broadcast analogue and digital, as well as satellite TV channels: 75% of news broadcasts in Ukrainian in each of the time intervals between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m. and between 6 p.m. and 10 p.m.; for satellite information channels: 75% of broadcasts in Ukrainian occur per week in each of the time intervals between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m. and between 6 p.m. and 10 p.m. An exception is provided for TV channels that speak the languages of the indigenous peoples of Ukraine (regardless of the broadcasting category): 75% of the Ukrainian language and the languages of the indigenous peoples of Ukraine per week, while at least 30% speak the Ukrainian language [7].

All these progressive innovations had a positive impact on the expansion of the

Ukrainian ethnocultural space and the functioning of the Ukrainian language, as well as on the revival of the national show business. In the conditions of the undeclared Russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, many musical performers from the Russian Federation were banned from entering Ukraine for their support of Russian aggression, and tours to the temporarily occupied Crimea unauthorised by the Border Service of Ukraine. Therefore, Ukrainian performers (mostly Ukrainian-speaking) began to fill this gap (both at live concerts and on television and radio broadcasts). Their quantity did not always turn into quality, but the process began, and the Ukrainian language began to regain its lost positions from Russian. The proof of this was the victory at the Eurovision Song Contest 2016 of the Ukrainian singer (Kirimli according to her ethnic origin) Jamala (Susana Alimivna Jamaladinova) with the song "1944" (in English and Ukrainian languages) about the deportation of the Crimean Tatar people from Crimea to Central Asia in 1944. This great success of Ukrainian popular music confirmed its successful development and gaining new momentum and recognition in Europe and the world.

The process of decommunization of Ukraine, which was actively supported by the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities in order to clean up the political, social, economic, and cultural life of the totalitarian past, is also worth noting.

On July 22, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law authorising the dissolution of the Communist fraction. On May 15, 2015, P. Poroshenko signed four "decommunization" laws, in particular "On the Condemnation of the Communist and National-Socialist Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and the Prohibition of Their Symbol

Propagandas.” Soviet symbols were banned, the communist regime was condemned, the archives of the Soviet special services were opened, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and other organisations were recognised as fighters for the independence of Ukraine. On May 17, 2015, P. Poroshenko stated that he “did what he had to do” and urged not to allow a new red or brown genocide against the Ukrainian people. On July 24, 2015, in the course of decommunization, the Ministry of Justice banned the Communist Party of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the CPU) from participating in local, parliamentary, and presidential elections, as it was a violation of Ukrainian legislation. Thus, the CPU and other organisations of various orientations of the communist party were deprived of their political status. On December 17, 2015, the District Administrative Court of Kyiv banned the activities of the CPU. By August 23, 2016, in the process of decommunization in Ukraine, more than 1,300 monuments to V. Lenin were dismantled, and 987 settlements and 26 districts were renamed [6].

In the early presidential elections in 2014, P. Poroshenko won the first round (he repeated the unique achievement of the first President of Ukraine, L. Kravchuk), but just like Leonid Makarovych, Petro Oleksiyovych could not run for a second term. Significant achievements attained by P. Poroshenko in the fields of state-building, nation-building, and ethnocultural formation were crossed out by his business alter ego and personal ambitions. Eventually, during the next presidential race in 2019, he got to the second round but lost to the new star of Ukrainian politics, V. Zelenskyi. The newly elected sixth President of Ukraine managed to quickly capitalise on his political image as a new face and led the “Servant of the

People” Party to victory in the early parliamentary elections in the summer of 2019. As a result of the so-called “Electoral Revolution”, a component of the National Ukrainian Revolution of the beginning of the 21st century, the political landscape in Ukraine was radically renewed. The newly created mono-majority in the parliament began to work in the so-called “turbo mode”, not always producing high-quality laws. In his previous show business activity, V. Zelenskyi actively cooperated with russian show business, always promoting the russian language and russian narratives in his work, and was quite critical of the Ukrainian language, history, culture, traditions, art, etc., testifying to his Little Russianness. A passionate part of Ukrainian society is perceived with caution as having a pro-russian background. Many Ukrainians perceived the victory of V. Zelenskyi as a personal catastrophe and were waiting for the return of pro-russian traitors and mankurts to all spheres of the social, political, cultural, and artistic life of Ukraine. The feeling of revenge by pro-russian and pro-imperial forces filled the Ukrainian mental space. Many citizens have persistent associations with the recent past: after pro-Ukrainian V. Yushchenko, pro-russian V. Yanukovych came to power, and the “russian world” invaded Ukraine in all its manifestations.

Kremlin supporters and secret agents have begun the process of important language law abolition. In June 2019, after the Presidential Election of Ukraine and the election and inauguration of Volodymyr Zelenskyi, before the law came into force, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine received a submission from 51 people’s deputies regarding the constitutionality of the law of Ukraine “On ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as a state

language”. In particular, the submission was signed mostly by people’s deputies from the “Opposition Bloc” fraction. According to the document, the deputies from the “Opposition Bloc,” O. O. Dolzhenkov, and the co-chairman of the “Opposition Bloc” fraction in the parliament, V. Novinsky, are the representatives of the submission authors. Thus, the authors stated that by the law, “Russian language is completely excluded at the legislative level from labour relations, the sphere of education, the sphere of science, the sphere of culture, the sphere of television and radio broadcasting, the sphere of printed mass media, the sphere of book publishing and book distribution, the sphere of computer user interfaces, computer programmes, and websites, the sphere of public events, the sphere of consumer service, the sphere of sports, the sphere of telecommunications and postal communication, the sphere of records management, document management, correspondence, and all other spheres of citizens’ lives.” Although this law does not apply to the languages of national minorities and cannot contradict the European Charter of Regional Languages since its provision specifies that “the Charter cannot abolish the obligation to use the state language,” it defines the use of the state language in accordance with the Constitution, the decision of the Constitutional Court of 1999, and the conclusions of the Venice Commission. In particular, regarding the law on minority languages, this project must be developed by the government within 6 months after the entry into force of the Law on Language. This is stated in the transitional provisions. Also, the law cannot be declared unconstitutional because it does not comply with the regulations, but only because it does not comply with the Constitution. Given that the

Verkhovna Rada considered the law for 20 sessions, which is a record, and during that time it considered more than 2,000 amendments. The Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Culture and Spirituality, M. Kniazhytskyi, commented on each amendment on the demand of the deputies, and the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, A. Parubii, or his Deputy Chairmen, I. Herashchenko and O. Syroid, asked for a vote. All amendments were considered in a constitutional way. 278 deputies out of the 226 required voted for the law. Therefore, those who claim that voting was not done in person must prove that at least 53 deputies did not vote in person. Eventually, on July 14, 2021, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine declared the Law constitutional. Judges S. Holovatyi, V. Kolisnyk, V. Lemak, O. Lytvynov, S. Sas, O. Pervomaiskyi, H. Yurovska expressed separate opinions on the court’s decision [1].

On December 10, 2019, people’s deputy from “Servant of the People” M. Buzhanskyi submitted to the parliament a draft law recognising the law “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as a State Language” as invalid “on the basis of newly discovered circumstances, taking into account the decision of the Venice Commission.” The people’s representative informed me about this on his Facebook page. M. Buzhansky argued for such a move with the conclusions of the Venice Commission, which stated that the new language law “cannot find a balance between strengthening the Ukrainian language and protecting the language rights of minorities.” The people’s deputy believes that the law is “aimed at discriminating against speakers of other languages”, first of all, Russian-speaking.” Friends, I submitted to the Parliament a draft law on recognition of the Law on the State Language as

such that lost its force. About the abolition of the law on language, if in this way it's more understandable. On the basis of newly discovered circumstances, taking into account the decision of the Venice Commission. We all understand very well that the current law has nothing in common with the protection and development of the Ukrainian language. This law is aimed at discriminating against native speakers of other languages, primarily Russian. This law directly harms our state, pushing our citizens out of our information field into a foreign one. This law kills and humiliates our Ukrainian-language literature, placing it in an uncompetitive position and preventing it from growing. This law is for those who do not want to see Ukraine as a strong, modern, multinational state," M. Buzhanskyi wrote. He expressed the opinion that the abolition of the current law on language "will open the possibility to write a really valuable document." For this, the people's deputy proposes to hold a broad discussion "between residents of the East and West of Ukraine, nationalists, rationalists, cultural figures, media representatives." "And the new law will correspond to the interests of our country and European values, about which the authors of the previous law spoke so much. And which they neglected, openly depriving and humiliating the rights of non-Ukrainian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. What is directly stated in the conclusions of the Venice Commission", Buzhanskyi concluded [9].

However, his anti-Ukrainian actions failed, as the socio-political situation gradually stabilised and the danger of pro-Russian revenge turned out to be somewhat exaggerated. For more than 30 years of the existence of the modern Ukrainian state, a consensus regarding its functioning has been formed in society. The vast majority of

citizens chose the European path of development, and Ukraine (with its unique ethnocultural complex) is an equal country in the EU.

Zelenskyi realised this very quickly, and despite his pro-Russian past, he began to actively transform himself into a pro-Ukrainian politician. The striking example of V. Yanukovich clearly testified whether you become a real Ukrainian president or whether a shameful collapse of your career awaits you. The newly elected authorities carefully monitored their own sociological ratings in the perception of their actions in Ukrainian society. Suddenly, V. Zelenskyi and his team realised that pro-Russian revanchist forces, especially politicians from the so-called "Opposition Platform—For Life" (hereinafter OPFL), are actively luring the electorate of "Servants of the People" to their side with their populist and anti-Ukrainian rhetoric.

Since pro-Russian television, controlled by reactionary politicians of the OPFL, facilitated this revanchist offensive, then on February 2, 2021, V. Zelenskyi imposed sanctions on pro-Russian television channels controlled by people's deputies T. Kozak and V. Medvedchuk – "112 Ukraine", "ZIK", "News One" and personal sanctions against their legal owner, Taras Romanovych, for a period of 5 years, which included, in particular: blocking of assets; prevention from withdrawal of capital outside Ukraine; suspension of economic and financial obligations; cancellation or suspension of licenses and other permits, the receipt (availability) of which is a condition for carrying out a certain type of activity; ban on using the radio frequency resource of Ukraine; termination of retransmission services, or distribution of television programs/provision of telecommunication services and use of

telecommunication networks. On February 22, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine imposed sanctions against V. Medvedchuk, the head of the OPFL, and his wife, O. Marchenko. Another six physical persons and 19 juridical persons were included in the sanctions list. The sanctions are related to the investigation conducted by the Security Service of Ukraine under the article “financing of terrorism”. Restrictions include the blocking of assets and the cancellation of licenses for subsoil use. On May 11, 2021, people’s deputies V. Medvedchuk and T. Kozak were charged with treason and plundering national resources on the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. On February 12, 2022, V. Zelenskyi imposed sanctions on Ye. Muraiiev’s “Nash” TV channel [3].

These sanctions were well received in Ukrainian society and significantly stopped the powerful influence of the revanchist policy of the rf on the information space of Ukraine and effectively weakened the pro-russian so-called “fifth column”.

At the same time, it should be noted that the kremlin’s puppets managed to stop the active development of the OCU. The pro-russian circle of V. Zelenskyi convinced him that the OCU is exclusively an image project of P. Poroshenko, and therefore its development should be slowed down in every possible way. That is probably why the “independent” Ukrainian judiciary slowed down and limited in every possible way the transfer of religious communities from the UOC MP to the OCU and did not react in any way to the use of so-called “titushky” and forceful methods of intimidation of pro-Ukrainian believers by the reactionary clergy of the pro-moscow church.

The notorious District Administrative Court of the city of Kyiv (hereafter DACK)

suspended the process of renaming the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Recall that on December 20, 2018, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the law “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations” regarding the name of religious organisations (associations) that are part of the structure of (are part of) a religious organisation (union), the control centre (management) of which is located outside of Ukraine in a state recognised by law as having carried out military aggression against Ukraine and/or temporarily occupied part of the territory of Ukraine,” which laid an obligation to change the name of the church. According to the results of the religious expert examination, approved by the Order of the Ministry of Culture № 37 of January 25, 2019, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Ukraine should be called the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in unity with the Russian Orthodox Church. On April 22, 2019, the DACK suspended the process of renaming the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Ukraine. On December 16, 2019, the Supreme Court of Ukraine allowed the UOC MP to keep its current name, leaving the name “Ukrainian Orthodox Church” to the Russian religious organization. Already on December 18, 2019, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports of Ukraine stated that the Supreme Court did not allow the RPC in Ukraine to use the name “Ukrainian Orthodox Church” [10].

Therefore, Minister of Culture Volodymyr Borodianskyi emphasised: “And we understand that the centre of influence on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is in Russia, in Moscow. Of course, Ukraine should somehow take this into account. And I believe that the principle that the Church must include in its name the identification that it belongs to

the Russian Orthodox Church is an understandable norm that simply defines who is who. Everyone should understand that the centre of influence on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is located in Moscow – through the same Synod. There is indeed a nuance that the state began to interfere in such elements as the name - this is not quite right. But in the period of war, in the period of aggression against our country, when events are taking place in the East, and they have been taking place for a long time, and when Crimea was occupied, I think it is normal when the country marks who is who” [4].

It is rumoured that S. Trofimov, as the First Deputy Head of Administration (later Head of the Office) of the President of Ukraine (21.05.2019–4.11.2020), a Ukrainian politician and businessman, one of the closest people in V. Zelenskyi’s circle, who actively lobbied for the interests of the UOC MP in Ukraine. Even after losing this influential position, Serhii Volodymyrovych, already as a freelance adviser, continued to protect the UOC MP and affected the views of Volodymyr Oleksandrovych on the religious situation in Ukraine [3].

It should also be noted that on July 1, 2021, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine voted in favour of draft law №5506 on indigenous peoples as a basis and in general. This is a presidential initiative that proposes to recognise the Crimean Tatars (Krymly), Karaites, and Krymchaks as indigenous peoples of Ukraine. A total of 325 people’s deputies from all factions and groups voted for the adoption, except for the OPFL deputies, who ignored this meeting. The document was presented by O. Reznikov, Vice Prime Minister for Development of the Temporarily Occupied Territories. He called this draft law historic. The concept of indigenous

people is included in the Constitution of Ukraine, but it has not yet been defined in legislation. The draft law stipulates that an indigenous people is an autochthonous ethnic community that was formed on the territory of Ukraine, is the native speaker of the original language and bearer of the original culture, has traditional, social, cultural, or representative bodies, recognises itself as an indigenous people of Ukraine, is an ethnic minority in its population, and does not have its own state entity outside of Ukraine. According to the draft law, Crimean Tatars, Karaites, and Krymchaks meet these criteria. All three peoples live on the territory of Crimea, temporarily occupied by the Russians. The explanatory note to the document states that the indigenous peoples of Ukraine and their representatives have the right, collectively and individually, to full possession of all human rights and fundamental freedoms defined in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and in international contracts. Also, this law determines guarantees for the indigenous peoples of Ukraine on legal protection against any actions aimed at: deprivation of signs of ethnicity and integrity as distinctive peoples; deprivation of cultural values; eviction or forced relocation from places of compact residence in any form; forced assimilation or forced integration in any form; encouraging or inciting racial, ethnic, or religious hatred directed against them. As you know, Russia as an occupying power, systematically and purposefully oppresses the rights of the indigenous population of Crimea. In turn, the President of the Russian Federation said that V. Zelenskyi’s draft law on indigenous peoples would force ethnic Russians to “rewrite” themselves in order not to feel like second-class people. The

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine previously stated that the Russian interpretation of the draft law on indigenous peoples has nothing to do with reality [8].

Conclusions. Thus, after analysing the ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society under the conditions of the undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war, we came to the following conclusions. First, the fourth stage of ethnocultural development of Ukrainian society (February 20, 2014–February 23, 2022) was marked by a radical change in the policy of the russian revanchist government, namely, a transition from the use of “soft power” (“russian peace”) to the use of “hard power” (the seizure of the Crimean peninsula by the rashists, the so-called “russian spring” and the invasion of russian troops into the territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine), and all this together led to the start of hostilities. Second, the russian-Ukrainian hybrid war turned out not to be an ordinary military confrontation but a civilizational confrontation. However, its hybridity, namely: skillful deception by the kremlin of its aggressive plans; successful deployment of a powerful propaganda company to whiten one’s own reputation in Europe and the world; cynical accusations of Ukraine for unleashing a civil war and genocide against the population of Donbass; active imitation of peace-keeping activities, etc., allowed the Russian leadership to pursue a purposeful foreign and domestic policy and to try to force Ukraine to peace on its own neo-imperial basis. Third, despite painful defeats on the battlefield (Illovaïsk, Debaltsevo, etc.), the shameful loss of Crimea and certain regions of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, various political and social troubles, Ukrainians survived and preserved statehood. Fourth, one of the main factors in this stability was

the Ukrainization of Ukraine in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. and the presence of its own ethnocultural space. Fifth, the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian ethnic and national identity, Ukrainian culture, and mentality not only united the citizens of Ukraine in repelling russian aggression, but gradually initiated the process of real, not formal, creation of the Ukrainian political nation. Sixth, politics, economy, military, education, culture, science, art, sports, etc. filled with Ukrainian-centric meanings started the systematic creation in the conditions of the undeclared russian-Ukrainian hybrid war of a new civilizational project: Ukraine of the 21st century.

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